Democrats could win 2026 and still lose the bigger fight | America, Actually

Overview

Sarah Longwell (Bullwark; host of the Focus Group podcast; author of How to Eat an Elephant) argues that Democrats can win elections (including potentially in 2026) and still lose the broader struggle against authoritarianism unless they change how they message and organize.

Her central claim: defeating authoritarianism requires persuasion—treating voters like adults, speaking to everyday concerns, and focusing on the real-world priorities that shape how people actually vote.

Key arguments and analysis

• Democratic persuasion beats “norms restoration” messaging

  • Longwell rejects the idea that the lesson of earlier resistance to Trump was simply: “we’re not Trump, so we’ll return to normal.”
  • She argues Trump has permanently shifted the baseline (“there is no going back”) and Democrats must explain what they will build next—because voters want an ongoing, practical plan.

• Washington doesn’t listen; pundit analysis “launders” opinion

  • From her focus-group work (including research after 2018), she says political elites and media frameworks often replace voters’ real feelings and needs with their own theories.
  • She emphasizes that voters aren’t primarily driven by ideology—they’re driven by material well-being and safety.

• “Talk to voters like real adults”: less artifice, more reality

  • In today’s media environment, audiences expect authenticity and conversation rather than staged performance.
  • She argues Democrats haven’t fully adapted, while Trump-style politics fits the interpersonal “real person in your living room” dynamic.

• Voters are not ideological; they’re sorting around shared needs

  • Longwell argues voters commonly prioritize core wants:
    • Affordable basics (gas/groceries)
    • Jobs and wage growth
    • Good education for kids
    • Safety
  • She criticizes Democrats for over-relying on abstract ideological battles or repeating policy lists that don’t connect to what people are trying to solve.

• Why anti-democracy messaging failed in 2024

  • She argues appeals to “democracy” didn’t unify voters as expected because:
    • Voters experience democracy through U.S.-specific, everyday elements (rule of law, free speech, checks and balances), not through the high-level slogan “democracy.”
    • The term “democracy” has become polarized, with each side labeling the other as the threat.
    • Practical concerns (e.g., gas prices and war-related risks) outweighed “pro-democracy” arguments in voter behavior.

• Democrats can run on issues like corruption—but legitimacy matters

  • A recurring tension: whether anti-corruption messaging lands if Democrats are perceived as closely tied to the same donors/donor networks they criticize.
  • (This is raised as a question in the discussion, reflecting her broader concern about credibility.)

• 2026 could look good, but the bigger authoritarian fight isn’t guaranteed

  • She warns Democrats may benefit from Republican weaknesses even while failing to build durable, persuasion-based coalitions.
  • She argues Republicans have been “hollowed out” beyond Trump, with no clear “Trump heir” who can replicate his unique voter connection.
  • Opportunity exists—but electoral wins should not be confused with strategic victory.

• Demographic and turnout shifts make midterms tougher

  • Longwell argues the electorate has changed in ways that can hurt Democrats:
    • High turnout historically benefited Democrats, but that pattern reversed by 2024.
    • Democrats’ usual base advantages (e.g., college-educated suburban voters) can behave differently in midterms, when voting skews toward lower-propensity, more information-light voters who decide based on perceived economic benefit.
  • She also suggests structural geography and population trends could worsen the path to Democratic wins if current patterns continue.

• Israel policy: compatible with Democratic base preferences, but requires unity

  • Polling suggests many Democrats want a reevaluation of the U.S. relationship with Israel, including changes such as an arms embargo.
  • She suggests the likely 2028 nominee may be a Jewish candidate who is critical of Israel—framing it as a way to heal internal Democratic divides while still pursuing electoral victory.

• AI is becoming a coalition issue (not just a tech debate)

  • Longwell argues AI matters politically because it crosses multiple voter “vectors”:
    1. Cost/energy prices (energy-intensive data centers)
    2. Rural quality-of-life impacts (land use and visible environmental effects)
    3. Job displacement fears (billionaires getting richer while workers lose out)
    4. additional anxiety about worst-case outcomes
  • She likens it to immigration politics: not only “what it is,” but how it’s emotionally packaged into a single understandable concern.
  • She also notes voters may use AI tools quickly for political guidance (e.g., “type in who should I vote for”), potentially accelerating how persuasion narratives form.

• Immigration: Democrats should take an “offense” posture

  • She argues Democrats shouldn’t treat immigration as only a defensive, “attack the other side” issue.
  • Effective messaging should combine fairness and legal order with secure-border credibility, offering a practical pathway that differentiates from Trump’s approach.

• On immigration and deportation: many voters don’t consume politics like elites

  • She contends many voters operate with different information realities than political enthusiasts.
  • Example: some people who opposed Trump’s harsher interior actions still focus on deporting “criminals,” processing events through what they think Trump promised versus what they see happening.
  • Her emphasis: most voters aren’t “political sickos”—the information ecosystem shapes what they conclude.

• Trans issues: Democrats can lead with humanity, then pivot

  • Longwell argues Democrats shouldn’t default to parroting Republican talking points.
  • Instead, they can start with humane principles (e.g., “leave little kids alone,” fairness at competitive levels) while also challenging voters on why the issue is obsessively foregrounded.
  • She frames “offense” as: state what you believe, then steer back to what the public cares about (the economy and other bread-and-butter issues).

Overall takeaway

Longwell’s throughline is that Democrats should win persuasion battles by grounding messaging in what voters experience daily—material well-being and safety—and coupling it with clear, credible plans to protect institutions and push back against authoritarianism.

Electoral success in 2026 is possible, but strategic success depends on whether Democrats adapt their language, coalition-building, and policy framing to how voters actually think and feel.

Presenters / contributors

• Sarah Longwell (Bullwark publisher; Focus Group podcast host; author of How to Eat an Elephant)
• Ste H. Hearnden (host; politics reporter/podcast host at Vox)