Sample Tort class

Main ideas and lessons

• Trespass to the person (structure of the lecture)

  • The lecture is about trespass to the person.
  • It covers (Part 1) principles/elements/liability, with later lectures focusing on defences.
  • Trespass to the person is said to consist of three torts:
    • Assault
    • Battery
    • False imprisonment
  • Core essence: these torts protect against wrongful and unlawful interference with another person.

• Protected interests

  • Bodily integrity
  • Personal integrity
  • Personal autonomy
  • Freedom of movement

• Direct vs indirect wrongful interferences

  • Direct interferences are assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
  • Indirect wrongful interferences include:
    • The rule in Wilkinson and Downton (nervous shock–style misstatement causing harm)
    • The statutory tort/offence regime for harassment and causing fear of violence

• Liability types

  • Trespass to the person can generate:
    • Civil liability
    • Criminal liability
  • It may also arise concurrently with other claims (e.g., negligence) if elements like duty, breach, causation, and damage can be shown.

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Part 1: Trespass to the person (direct torts) — elements and principles

General definition of trespass to the person (as stated)

Defendant conduct must be:

• Unlawful
• Intentional (not accidental)
• Unpermitted (without consent / not authorized)
• Causing interference with the body of another person

“Eight common factors” listed (with the lecture’s explanations)

1. Actionable per se
   • The claimant does not need to prove harm or damage.
2. Intentional conduct
   • Must be intentional, not accidental.
   • Example: Blake and Galloway (2004) — no liability where intent to injure was absent.
3. Committed directly
   • The wrongdoing must be done by direct means (not indirect causation).
   • Example contrast:
     • Liability: defendant throws a log and hits the plaintiff.
     • No liability: defendant throws a log on the road and plaintiff later trips over it.
4. No legal permission/authorization/excuse
   • Conduct must be not permitted or excused by law.
5. No consent
   • Conduct must be without consent expressed or implied → non-consensual.
6. Remoteness of damage (direct consequences test)
   • Mentions a direct consequences approach for remoteness (compared to Re Polemis (1921)).
7. Can create criminal liability as well
   • Same conduct may ground both tort and criminal offenses.
8. Concurrent liability with other torts possible
   • May coexist with negligence if negligence elements (duty, breach, causation) are satisfied.

Criminal liability principles introduced: mens rea and actus reus

• Two essential principles:
  • Mens rea (“mental element”): intention, recklessness, or gross negligence.
  • Actus reus (“physical element”): prohibited act/consequences.
• Coincidence rule: criminal liability requires mens rea + actus reus together.
• Examples given:
  • Murder: unlawful killing; mens rea = intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.
  • Theft: appropriation; mens rea = intention to steal + dishonesty.

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Assault — what the lecture says it is, and key requirements

Definition (as presented)

• Assault = an intentional and unlawful act threatening physical contact
  • which causes in the victim a reasonable apprehension/expectation of immediate unlawful force/contact
• Defendant must have capacity to carry out the threat.

Cases illustrating assault’s limits and rules

• Stevens and Myers (1830)
  • Raised clenched fist gesture but physically restrained before reaching claimant → no assault (no possibility to carry out).
• Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (1986)
  • Striking miners harangue colleagues on a bus; threatened gestures physically impossible to carry out → no assault.
  • However, a credible threat can suffice even if not actually deliverable:
    • Example: pointing an unloaded gun at someone who doesn’t know it’s unloaded → still assault.
• Meresgo and Lobo (2006) (spelled inconsistently in subtitles)
  • Alleged plan not imminent → no assault.
• Ireland (silent telephone calls; presented as a criminal assault case)
  • Silence caused psychiatric harm through fear → treated as criminal assault.
• Tuberville and Savage (1669)
  • Hand on sword + conditional wording (“if it were not…” language) suggested no intent to carry out → no assault.
• Queen v Wilson (1955)
  • Words “let’s get out the knives” held sufficiently threatening.

“Four points” to remember for assault

1. Immediacy
   • Threat must be capable of being carried out immediately.
2. Unlawful force/contact
   • Attempted force/contact must be unlawful.
3. Apprehension
   • Claimant must reasonably apprehend/expect unlawful contact.
4. Intention
   • Must be intentional (not accidental/careless).

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Battery — what the lecture says it is, and key requirements

Definition (as presented)

• Battery = actual application of force / actual bodily contact
• Defined as:
  • intentional
  • unwanted
  • unlawful
  • application of force or contact to the body of another.
• Intent relates to the act, not to consequences.

Doctrines/examples emphasized

• Transferred intention / transferred malice
  • If defendant strikes A thinking to assault A but hits C instead → battery on C.
  • Example mentioned: “strikes at b but misses and hits c instead.”
• No need for intention to harm
  • Battery can occur even if defendant didn’t intend injury.
• Criminal assault can be equivalent to battery
  • Hasted and Chief Constable of Derbyshire (2000)
    • Punching a woman → baby dropped → criminal liability described as equivalent to battery (transferred intent concept used).
• Negligence not enough, but intent to unlawful contact can still be inferred
  • Example framed as transferred malice: firing bullets that miss intended person but hit passengers; held to constitute battery even if soldiers “did not intend” the actual victims.
• Causation by deliberate actions even if further acts occur
  • Scott and Shepherd (1773)
    • Lighted squib thrown into marketplace; third parties throw it onward; eventual injury still attributed to defendant.
• Intent can exist despite an initially accidental act
  • Fagin and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)
    • Accidentally drives on officer’s foot; delays 25 seconds before moving away → intention for the second act.
• Omissions generally don’t trigger battery
  • Passive behavior doesn’t trigger battery; there must be contact.

Force/contact rules (as described)

• Contact can be:
  • violent or slight
  • through objects/instruments
  • via an animal owned/instigated by defendant
  • not necessarily “hostile” or “angry”
• Examples listed as possible battery:
  • hitting, slapping, pushing, punching, touching, knife attacks, shooting, dog bite
  • unwanted kiss, unwanted hug
  • unwanted haircut (general “unwanted contact” example)

Hostility as a requirement (lecture’s conclusion)

• The lecture states hostility is not an ingredient of battery.
• It contrasts older views with House of Lords authority:
  • Cases suggesting hostility might be required:
    • Call and Turner (1704)
    • Wilson and Pringle (1987) (hostile touching vs prank)
  • Leading authority against requiring hostility:
    • F v West Berkshire Health Authority (1990) (House of Lords) — “touching must be hostile” doubted; examples include prank getting out of hand, medical treatment mistake, etc.
• Test emphasized: whether physical contact has gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct, depending on circumstances.
  • Example used: Collins and Wilcock (1984) (self-defense framing for police grabbing—unlawful contact justified self-defence response).

“Four points” to remember for battery

1. Intention/deliberateness
2. Contact/force must exist
3. Directness
   • includes contact through objects/instruments (knife, stick, bullet) or something thrown/instigated by defendant
4. Hostility not required
   • unlawful unwanted contact suffices “no matter how slight.”

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False imprisonment — what the lecture says it is, and key requirements

Definition (as presented)

• False imprisonment = unlawful/unjustified imprisonment, i.e.:
  • intentional
  • complete restraint
  • of someone’s freedom of movement
  • without lawful excuse
• Malice not required.
• Actual harm/suffering not required.
• For liability:
  • restraint must be complete
  • there must be no reasonable alternative means of escape/exit.

Knowledge/awareness of restraint (lecture’s account)

• Earlier cases suggested knowledge was necessary.
• Later cases (lecture’s “leading authority”) say knowledge is not necessary.

Key cases as described:

• Bird and Jones (1845)
  • Public road closed for boat race; alternative routes existed → no false imprisonment (not complete restriction).
• Herring and Boyle (1834)
  • Mother prevented from taking child; court held victim must know of deprivation to succeed.
• Meering and Graham White Aviation Co Ltd (1920) (presented as leading authority)
  • Security guards prevented claimant leaving without his knowledge → court of appeal said actual knowledge not necessary.
  • Lecture emphasizes civil-liberty approach: possible to be imprisoned “while asleep, drunk, unconscious, or a lunatic.”
• Murray and Ministry of Defence (1988) and Queen v Bournemouth Community and Mental Health Service (1999)
  • Affirms Meering dicta: knowledge/awareness not necessary.
• Lecture also states:
  • False imprisonment occurs only through acts of restraint, not mere omissions/failure to act.

Omission not enough: key case

• Herd and Weardale (1915)
  • Miners wanted to be brought to surface early; defendant had no obligation and did nothing → no false imprisonment (no actionable omission).
• Another example about “not total restriction”:
  • Robinson and Balmain Ferry Co (1910)
    • Notices required payment to leave; court said not total restriction because plaintiff had a choice (leave by paying or other route).

“Four points” to remember for false imprisonment

1. Intention required
   • malice/intent to harm not necessary.
2. No need for claimant’s knowledge
3. Complete restraint of movement
4. Must be a positive act
   • not an omission or failure to act.

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Part 2 (indirect interference): Wilkinson and Downton + statutory harassment

Rule in Wilkinson and Downton (intentional indirect interference)

Rule (as described)

• Based on Wilkinson and Downton (1897):
  • Defendant made a willful false statement that husband had a serious accident.
  • Claimant suffered physical and psychological harm.
  • Court treated this as willfully causing infringement of personal safety; the rule is linked to an intention to achieve the relevant effect.
• Lecture frames the rule as:
  • A cross between trespass and negligence
  • No direct contact required
  • No actual intention to do the act or cause harm required (recklessness might be enough).
  • Defendant is “deemed” to intend the resultant harm.

Cases mentioned applying the rule

• Crocker Sanjian and Bush (1993) (spelled inconsistently)
  • Persistent unwanted pursuit/assault-abuse/pestering after relationship breakdown at parents’ home → liability under the rule.
• Wong and Parkside Health NHS Trust (2001)
  • Requires actual damage:
    • physical harm or recognized psychiatric illness
  • Defendant must have intended to violate the claimant’s interest in freedom from such harm.
  • Emotional distress alone is not enough (as stated later).

Distinction from negligence (as stated)

• Negligence needs duty of care + breach + causation + damage.
• Wilkinson and Downton:
  • requires intentional indirect interference
  • focuses on actual damage (physical harm/recognized psychiatric illness).

Can trespass be committed negligently?

• The lecture discusses uncertainty and then states modern position:
  • Fowler and Lenning (1959) (as described):
    • suggests claimant must prove defendant action was intentional or negligent.
  • Letang and Cooper (1965):
    • observed trespass can only be intentional, not negligent (lecture says this was obiter regarding limitations).
  • Accepted position (lecture):
    • trespass to the person could be committed negligently because negligent acts can sometimes amount to intention or gross negligence → intention inferred.

Mens rea/intention limitation for Wilkinson and Downton

• Wainwright and Home Office (2001) (as described)
  • “No liability on facts” due to lack of intent and physical harm.
  • Limiting factor described as intention to cause harm, or recklessness as to whether harm would be caused.
  • No liability for less than psychiatric injury; no liability for mere emotional distress.

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Harassment and “causing fear of violence” (Protection from Harassment Act regime + amendments)

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (lecture’s description)

• Creates two criminal offences:
  1. Harassment (section 2)
  2. Causing fear of violence (section 4)
• Also a civil wrong:
  • damages and restraining order possible (section 3).
• Key threshold (“diminimus”)
  • Requires at least two incidents (at least two occasions).

Harassment (section 1 / criminal section 2 as described)

A person must not pursue a course of conduct including speech that amounts to harassment, where:

• the person knows or ought to know it is harassment, or

• a reasonable person would consider it harassment.

• At least two occasions to the same person or a group may create a cause of action.

Causing fear of violence (section 4 as described)

• Offence if a person engages in a course of conduct including speech on at least two occasions that causes another person to fear violence.
• Defendant guilty if he knows or a reasonable person would know that fear of violence would be caused.

Meaning of harassment (lecture’s description)

• Includes causing alarm or distress in an oppressive and unacceptable way.
• Mentions Marjowski and Guys and Saint Thomas’s NHS Trust (2016):
  • categories of harassment are not closed—left to courts.

Examples of harassment listed (cases)

• Stalking
• Victimization via publication of newspaper articles
• Workplace bullying
• Unwarranted bills with threats of legal action
• Intimidating public demonstrations/campaigns

(cases named in subtitles include: Thomas and News Group Newspapers Ltd; March Rovinsky and Guys and Saint Thomas’s NHS Trust (2016); Ferguson and British Gas (2009); Dutchy UK Ltd and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (2003)—spelling varies)

Remedies and defences (as stated)

• Civil remedies: damages + (if necessary) restraining order.
• Defence to harassment: if defendant shows actions were:
  • for preventing/detecting crime
  • pursuant to a legal/statutory duty
  • reasonable
  • or authorized by the Secretary of State (as referenced to section 4)

Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (amendments and new offences)

• In force 26 Nov 2012
• Amends sections 2 and 4 of the 1997 Act.
• Creates two “specific” stalking-related offences:
  • Stalking
  • Causing fear of violence through stalking
• Defines stalking conduct to include (section 2A subsection 3 examples listed):
  • following a person
  • publishing statements/materials related to a person
  • loitering in public/private places
  • watching/spying
  • interfering with property/possessions
  • monitoring communications (email, phone calls, internet)
  • plus “course of conduct” involving act or omission” as framed by subtitles.

Consequences mentioned

• If established, offences can lead to imprisonment.
• For “causing fear of violence” through stalking:
  • punishment can include imprisonment where the defendant knows/ought to know it will cause fear and/or serious alarm/distress affecting daily activities.

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Speakers / sources featured (named individuals, courts, statutes, and repeated authorities)

Statutes / Acts

• Protection from Harassment Act 1997
• Protection of Freedoms Act 2012

Torts / legal doctrines / rules

• Trespass to the person (assault, battery, false imprisonment)
• Rule in Wilkinson and Downton (1897)
• Transferred malice (in battery context)
• Mens rea / Actus reus (criminal liability coincidence principle)

Cases cited (as they appeared in subtitles)

• Wilkinson and Downton (1897)
• Blake and Galloway (2004)
• Re Polemis (1921)
• Stevens and Myers (1830)
• Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (1986)
• Mersogo and Lobo (2006) (name unclear in subtitles)
• Ireland
• Tuberville and Savage (1669)
• Queen v Wilson (1955)
• Hasted and Chief Constable of Derbyshire (2000)
• Scott and Shepherd (1773)
• Fagin and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969)
• Call and Turner (1704)
• Wilson and Pringle (1987)
• F v West Berkshire Health Authority (1990)
• Collins and Wilcock (1984)
• Bird and Jones (1845)
• Herring and Boyle (1834)
• Meering and Graham White Aviation Co Ltd (1920)
• Murray and Ministry of Defence (1988)
• Queen v Bournemouth Community and Mental Health Service (1999)
• Herd and Weardale (1915)
• Robinson and Balmain Ferry Co (1910)
• Crocker Sanjian and Bush (1993) (spelling inconsistent)
• Wong and Parkside Health NHS Trust (2001)
• Fowler and Lenning (1959)
• Letang and Cooper (1965)
• Wainwright and Home Office (2001)
• Marjowski and Guys and Saint Thomas’s NHS Trust (2016)
• Thomas and News Group Newspapers Ltd
• March Rovinsky and Guys and Saint Thomas’s NHS Trust (2016) (spelling varies)
• Ferguson and British Gas (2009)
• Dutchy UK Ltd and Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (2003) (spelling varies)
• Christmas (appears as “christmas” — likely a case name; full citation not clearly given)