De nieuwe criminele handel in de Rotterdamse haven

Overview: Tank-storage fraud in the Port of Rotterdam

The video investigates tank-storage fraud in the Port of Rotterdam—a scheme where criminals convince buyers that oil is stored at specific tanks by using real-looking documentation and locations, then charging daily storage fees for oil that often does not exist at those facilities.

How the scheme works (and why it’s hard to detect)

• The oil trade is depicted as complex and logistics-heavy, where expertise in ports, shipping flows, documentation, and tank/storage operations matters.
• Victims are lured into paying for “tank storage” (often 3–5 days) at rates reportedly around €60,000–€80,000 per day.
• Fraudsters exploit existing tanks/terminals by pointing buyers to them using coordinates and paperwork that implies the oil is present.
• Key point: scammers can lead buyers to the “right place,” but the product is not actually there.

Case study: AIF scammed via “Green Tank Logistics”

• A buyer/operator, AIF (with an investor AIF described as based in Birmingham), paid large sums after being told that paying for storage would provide proof and test access.
• The supposed storage company was Green Tank Logistics.
• Investigators attempt to locate the oil based on provided information and find that:
  • The oil is not there.
  • The “tank storage company” appears to be fake or misused, with alleged non-existent documents and clearance certificates, and reused branding (logo taken from elsewhere).
• AIF and advisers reviewing the paperwork describe the documents as fabricated, including claims of no real port clearance.

How “Green Tank Logistics” may be involved (or misused)

• The video reports that Green Tank Logistics has a website stating the company has been active since 2016, with contact details.
• When the filming team asks about the company at the registered address, the owner says:
  • They were shocked to learn the name is being used by criminals.
  • The company was registered, but no real activities were allegedly carried out—suggesting the legal entity may have been repurposed to appear legitimate.

Scale of the problem and response efforts

The video frames tank storage fraud as a frequent and growing problem in Rotterdam:

• Reported losses exceed €1 million already defrauded this year.
• A database/website, initiated with police, port authority, and victims (including Roger and Peter), tracks:
  • A whitelist of legitimate companies.
  • A blacklist of companies suspected to be fake or near-fake.
• The video also claims authorities/victims have helped prevent substantial further losses (figures mentioned include €1.3 billion in prevented transactions, depending on whether parties verify proposed deals).
• Even with many reports to police, perpetrators are often not caught because:
  • Extensive investigation is required to identify those behind the crime.
  • The international character of the fraud complicates prosecution.

First court case in the Netherlands: fake refinery “sample test” video

The video highlights an earlier prosecution:

• A case involved a manipulated video sent to potential buyers to imply samples were being taken from Shell premises.
• Investigators say the “tests” were fake: the footage showed refinery employees or people with access, but not the real staged sampling claim.
• The prosecution used the video as evidence and is presented as the first tank storage fraud case brought before a Dutch court.
• Commentary from a research expert and the port authority emphasizes the risk that criminals can operate near facilities—“back doors” being vulnerable even inside systems or through personnel access.

Broader warning: could be more than ordinary fraud

In its concluding argument, the video warns tank storage fraud may overlap with:

• Undermining (sabotage/hostile interference)
• Possible state actors or future state-linked activity
• Serious organized crime

A major takeaway is that viewers shouldn’t assume this is only opportunistic fraud against large multinationals. The video suggests the line between criminal activity and state interference is “razor-thin.” It urges better prevention via government resources for digital and security measures.

Presenters / contributors

• Peter and Rogé (oil trade advisors; also victims/advisers)
• AIF (the buyer/investor entity discussed; not a single on-camera person clearly named)
• AF Aslam (mentioned as being based in Birmingham and attempting to enter oil trading)
• Eile Stelstra of Klingendaal (researcher on societal resilience)
• Shell (company perspective cited; no on-camera comment)
• Port authority (official statements summarized)
• Police (participating role referenced in launching the anti-fraud website)