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Overview

Sergey Aleksashenko reviews the Bank of Russia’s decision at its Sept. 12, 2026 meeting to leave the key rate unchanged at 14%. He says the decision was unexpected, because he anticipated further cuts (about 25 bps) absent any major new economic information.

1) Why the central bank kept the rate unchanged

Aleksashenko argues the Bank of Russia relied on two main points:

• Current inflation has accelerated, especially during summer. He notes the argument that the first driver (fuel price increases) was later joined by second-round effects—higher business costs, inflation expectations, and demand.

• Budget uncertainty. The Bank treats the budget situation as important for later years (2029–2030), though Aleksashenko argues Russia’s “three-year” budget planning is effectively only about six months because it is frequently revised. He also believes the central bank learned little new, since the Ministry of Finance had already signaled spending increases earlier and market financing difficulties for the deficit have been known.

2) Aleksashenko’s inflation critique: “acceleration” may not match the data logic

He directly challenges the claim that inflation is out of control:

• Using Rosstat-based calculations, he says inflation’s trajectory is somewhat higher than the Bank’s estimate, but not catastrophic.
• He emphasizes that deflation was recorded in August and treats this as meaningful (seasonality, in his view, doesn’t explain it every year).
• He examines weekly inflation dynamics and argues the acceleration appears temporary; he also says inflation behavior relative to last year is not clearly worse.
• He criticizes the Bank’s reliance on inflation expectations surveys:
  • Population expectations do not show a stable relationship to actual Rosstat inflation.
  • He argues survey results reflect how people interpret current inflation (including media/social effects), rather than acting as a reliable “forecasting mirror” of real inflation.
• For business inflation expectations, he adds a further concern:
  • The Bank appears to revise/shift prior published values in its bulletins, making the indicator hard to interpret.
  • He also calls it a lagging signal—about 1.5 months old.

3) Key-rate lag argument: he warns the Bank may be acting “too late”

Aleksashenko frames monetary policy as affecting inflation with roughly a 9-month lag. Under that framework:

• When the rate was lowered (e.g., from 18% to 16%), inflation later accelerated, suggesting easing may have been premature.
• He concludes the Bank may be underestimating inflationary pressure, especially pressure tied (directly or indirectly) to large-scale military spending.
• His main “watch item” for the rest of the year is whether the inflation upswing is:
  • structural/inertial (policy-relevant), or
  • merely seasonal (he mentions fuel/gasoline effects as one possibility).

4) New GDP data: strong quarterly growth but long-run stagnation

He then turns to Rosstat’s second-quarter GDP release, noting that revisions may occur later:

• Second quarter vs first quarter: GDP growth is described as “fantastic,” nearly +1% QoQ (about +4% annualized), with most sectors rising except:
  • electricity/steam/gas supply
  • and extraction, including declines in oil-related output.
• He argues the surge is partly explained by a weak first quarter, making the broader picture less dramatic:
  • Half-year (Q1+Q2) growth is about +0.5%.
• Year-over-year (Q2 2026 vs Q2 2025): growth is less than 1%, and he characterizes the economy as stagnant rather than meaningfully expanding.
• Over roughly the past 1.5 years, he sees a stagnation phase.

5) Longer-run macro framing: war and foreign-policy costs

In a broader historical assessment, he argues Russia has fallen behind its pre-2014 growth potential:

• Compared with a scenario in which Russia could grow around 4% per year (estimated potential in the early 2010s), he claims that from the end of 2013 to mid-2026, Russia’s average growth has been about 1.4%, implying a sustained gap versus global growth.
• Over 12.5 years, he estimates Russia has lost the equivalent of roughly 2.2 years of growth (in cumulative GDP terms) due to policy choices linked to the Crimea/Ukraine-era pivot and subsequent war-related developments.
• He emphasizes that the “real cost of war” is not only budget outlays, but also lost growth and the expanding future burden as the conflict continues.

Presenters / contributors

• Sergey Aleksashenko (host/presenter)