Путин хочет оккупировать Казахстан | Виталий Портников @DinarionLive

Overview

This interview/discussion features Ukrainian journalist and political analyst Vitaly Portnikov about Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana and the opening of an EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union) summit, framed by the broader context of the war in Ukraine and its implications for post-Soviet politics.

Main points and arguments

“Ceremony” vs. reality of influence

Portnikov argues that the high-level pageantry around Putin’s arrival—military demonstrations, orchestras, and orchestrated displays of respect—signals more than protocol. Instead, it reflects a hybrid post-Soviet diplomatic style:

• Kazakhstan and other states may publicly flatter Moscow.
• Yet their real choices are constrained by Russia’s weakened position after the war.

He also claims Kazakhstan’s praise of Putin is often interchangeable rhetoric, comparable to Kazakhstan’s compliments to other major powers (e.g., Trump or China). Therefore, it does not necessarily indicate genuine strategic alignment.

Russia’s post-Soviet leverage is shrinking

Portnikov contends that although Russia attempts to project status, its ability to dominate the post-Soviet space is deteriorating, especially after Russia failed to achieve its desired outcomes in Ukraine.

He suggests that before the full-scale war, Russia could exert stronger control, while afterward elites increasingly try to avoid provoking Moscow while protecting their own interests.

Protocols as a signal: who can be forced and who can’t

Using the example of May 9 / Red Square attendance, Portnikov argues that some leaders (notably Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) came only after persistent personal persuasion by Putin. This is presented as evidence that:

• Russia’s influence has limits.
• Other states are increasingly willing to refuse symbolic participation.
• Even Russia’s “most important protocol day” is no longer treated as automatic loyalty.

Security measures around Putin: status + paranoia

The discussion notes heavy security in Astana (e.g., armored vehicles, helicopters, motorcycles, and reports of anti-aircraft equipment). Portnikov interprets this as:

• A status display
• A sign that Putin does not feel safe, particularly in a wartime environment where remote/technological threats are common.

Why Putin visits Kazakhstan so often

Portnikov argues Putin’s travel options are constrained by:

• Arrest risk connected to the ICC
• Geopolitical limitations, with Western countries largely off-limits

He lists possible/conditional destinations for Putin as mainly post-Soviet states and some in the Global South. He also notes that even China is visit-controlled by Xi, rather than by Putin.

Tokayev’s praise of Putin as routine political “sugar”

Portnikov comments on Tokayev describing Putin as an “outstanding statesman” and emphasizing Russia’s importance. He argues these statements are largely standard and performative, not policy-changing.

Tokayev’s meeting with Zelensky as a political signal

A key theme is that Russia did not respond harshly to Tokayev meeting Zelensky on the margins of the UNGA, which Portnikov interprets as follows:

• Moscow can tolerate it because Kazakhstan is prioritized in Russia’s balancing strategy.
• Russia is not (or not able) to create an open rupture with Astana over Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy maneuvers.

He contrasts this with Russia’s sharper propaganda reactions to other regional meetings involving Zelensky.

Diplomacy in Kyiv: no mass evacuation of missions

Portnikov discusses how embassies from CSTO/EAEU member states have not evacuated from Kyiv despite Russian strikes. He reads this as hybrid behavior:

• preserving formal relations with Russia,
• without fully adopting Russia’s security posture.

He also argues that Russian MFA statements about threats to diplomats often function mainly to limit responsibility rather than provide genuine military warnings.

Portnikov’s central warning: a legal basis for possible Russian force in Kazakhstan

Portnikov strongly claims that a newly adopted Russian law about protecting “Russian-speaking people” (including authorization related to troop use) is effectively intended for future pressure or intervention in Kazakhstan, not only for the Baltics.

He suggests such a framework could be used to justify troop entry into Kazakhstan without CSTO-type consent, and frames this as part of Putin’s broader post-Soviet imperial strategy.

Armenia’s EAEU summit absence as a political demarche

Portnikov says Nikol Pashinyan refused to attend the EAEU summit (sending a deputy instead) for political reasons tied to:

• Armenia’s EU-oriented rapprochement
• Russia’s pressure amid upcoming elections

He describes Armenia’s earlier movement into the EAEU/CSTO as “artificial,” driven by Russian blackmail connected to the Nagorno-Karabakh context. He argues Russia fears Armenia’s European integration because it undermines Russian leverage in the region.

Russia’s imperial concept: first Ukraine, then the rest

Portnikov presents Russia’s strategy as restoring control over Ukraine first, turning Russia into a “geopolitical gendarme,” and only afterward expanding control over other former Soviet states.

He also argues Russia has not annexed Belarus because it effectively needs Ukraine to sustain its broader imperial logic.

Sovereignty for Kazakhstan: independence is not the same as sovereignty

Portnikov emphasizes that Kazakhstan’s key task is to become a sovereign actor—not just formally independent—by:

• developing defense capacity
• balancing relations with Russia, the West (especially the US), and China

He warns that weakening international law increases the risk of borders changing in favor of stronger states, and he points to Russian chauvinistic claims as an ongoing threat to Kazakhstan’s territory.

Overall conclusion

Portnikov’s overall thesis is that Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space is weakening after the war in Ukraine, but Russia remains dangerous—both militarily and through legal-political mechanisms that could justify pressure or intervention (especially toward Kazakhstan).

In his view, Kazakhstan’s survival as a real sovereign state depends on strengthening defense and pursuing a diversified foreign policy, particularly by building relations beyond Russia.

Presenters or contributors

• Dinara Egiubaeva — host (on the channel Dinarion, “Karla Keshdostar” in subtitles)
• Vitaly Portnikov — guest (Ukrainian journalist and political observer/analyst)