20 Years of Finding Multibaggers In 60 minutes! | Ather, Paytm, Eternal | Dinshaw Irani

Finance-focused summary

Dinshaw Irani (Helios) discusses Helios’s contrarian, rules-based approach to identifying “multibaggers” in India—especially “new-age” and small/mid-cap themes—using rigorous stock elimination and active portfolio review cycles.

Key market / investing ideas & recommendations

• Contrarian belief: “There’s nothing like a long term” (long-term returns are built from repeatedly reassessing positions).
• Active review cadence: Holdings are re-evaluated every 3–6 months. Analysts must justify why the fund still holds each stock, including re-checking management and even suppliers/vendors.
• No FOMO: They don’t chase rallies; they continuously analyze a universe (e.g., NSE 500 rankings) to find better opportunities.
• No cash holding: They state they are “never in love with our stocks” and “never carry cash.”
• Risk management through selection + churn:
  • Small caps: churn/refresh is necessary because stocks move quickly; they aim to manage volatility rather than pass passively.
  • Concentration is managed via a diversified-but-not-too-small set of holdings (see “portfolio metrics” below).

Elimination investing framework (8-stage model)

They describe an 8-stage “rejection” (elimination) model called elimination investing.

Stages 1–3: Industry check

Reject if the stock doesn’t have a structural growth story without disruption or cyclicality.

Stages 4–6: Quality checks

Reject if it fails:

• Quality of management
• Corporate governance
• Quality of accounting

Goal: “quality and growth” with “assured growth built in.”

Stages 7–8: Valuation filters

Final elimination depends on whether valuation requirements are met.

• Among those passing earlier stages, probability of clearing valuation is about “1 in 3” (a low strike rate).

Key concept: “Growth at a value” (not pure growth, not pure value).

Reverse DCF method (valuation discipline)

Instead of forecasting value from discounted cash flows normally, they use reverse DCF:

• Plug in the market price as the “net present value”
• Solve for the terminal growth rate required to justify today’s price
• If the required terminal growth rate is “unjustifiably high,” they exit/reject

Universe + screening funnel (numbers)

• Universe analyzed: ~2,500+ companies
• After Stage 6: ~540–550 companies remain
• After Stage 8: ~180 companies remain
• Investable universe: effectively ~100–150 companies (described as dynamic)

Additional notes:

• Stages 1–6 are “fairly permanent” and only change if industry or management changes.
• Stage 6 valuation is the variable that can change the final investable set.

Macro/context views (India growth + sector preference)

India growth forecast

They forecast:

• GDP: ~6%–6.5% real basis
• ~10.5% rough cut
• Timeline: next ~5–6 years

They argue India’s growth needs consumption to kick in (not only capex or exports).

Sector thesis: BFSI + Consumption

• BFSI (banking + financial intermediaries + capital market plays): increased per-capita income drives more consumption needs finance.
• Consumption: primarily discretionary, with expansions into:
  • Hospitality
  • Healthcare
• They treat consumption differently than pure FMCG, implying FMCG won’t dominate due to limited incremental consumption frequency.

Portfolio construction examples & company-specific points (tickers)

Companies / instruments mentioned

• PTM (Paytm)
• SBI (State Bank of India)
• Zomato
• Swiggy
• Ather (Ather Energy)
• Ola (Ola Electric)
• Hero / TVS / “Vaj/other auto incumbents” (TVS referenced; some text appears garbled)
• Uber (and DoorDash as a U.S. analogy)
• Unilever (example of quality but low growth/high valuation)
• Nifty 500 / NSE 500 (benchmarks)
• Mutual funds, IPOs, ETFs, stocks (ad segment)

Paytm (PTM) — why they held and added despite concerns

They cite “JAM” macro/structural drivers:

• Jan Dhan + Aadhaar + Mobile

They argue:

• UPI and “new age platform” usage drive upside
• Active users can scale with next 5+ years of exponential potential in the platform ecosystem

In Dec 2024, they noted concerns including:

• Regulatory risk
• Founder risk
• Chinese shareholder selling

Despite this, they continued holding and even invested more after listing uncertainty eased/approvals improved.

Zomato — how they built conviction

• Initially viewed it as food delivery, with quick commerce as “icing on the cake.”
• Referenced management communication:
  • Promoters weren’t meeting investors/analysts often initially
  • Later they issued a “path to profits”-type document (a 14–15 page deck) on contribution margin improvement and a beta-positive direction
• They like a two-player market global analogy (Uber Eats context; sector consolidation logic).
• They describe learning/tracking execution details and buying during periods where the price didn’t move much.

Ather Energy — why they liked EV “tech + premium execution”

They describe Ather as:

• A “technology play” akin to how Tesla was positioned
• Focused on “electric dream” rather than only scooters

They acknowledged IPO pricing anxiety:

• IPO price cited around ₹280–₹290
• They said they were “anchors” and another anchor declined

They claim Ather’s premium positioning and product quality prevented the “cheap EV” failure pattern they associate with Ola (quality issues → stock decline).

They state Ather remains attractive even at this price (with a caution that it’s not a recommendation).

Ola — why it failed their thesis

They exited due to:

• Recurring market-share losses every month
• Bread-and-butter EV performance deterioration
• Tech product narrative not translating into sustainable EV dominance

They emphasize learning from mistakes and moving out.

Financials / performance metrics mentioned

• Helios AUM: scaled to over ₹15,000 crores
• Performance references:
  • Chair’s “4x in the last …” (timeline unclear due to truncated subtitle)
  • Helios portfolio CAGR / “keer” since inception: ~21–22% (stated)
  • Mentions 5% alpha or 3–4% alpha as a more conservative messaging frame (alpha vs. CAGR)
• They use goal-like thinking:
  • They address the fear that clients will ask: “Will I see this 21% CAGR in the next 5 years also?”
  • They say it can’t be guaranteed.

Risk management + portfolio rebalancing signals

• Trim timing: They started trimming at the beginning of this year (early in the year referred to in subtitles).
• Private banks concerns:
  • Signal: CASA compression (cheap deposits shrinking)
  • Structural shift due to fintech and easier alternatives
  • PSU banks becoming more aggressive lenders as interest rates fell, pressuring loan market share and affecting private banks’ spreads (NIM)
• PSU bank risk:
  • They call PSUs “highly leveraged,” with leverage around 11–12x
  • Fear: a cycle turn could cause NPA blow-ups
  • They generally avoid PSUs but still like SBI as an exception due to lower leverage

“Evergreen” principles (as stated)

• No guaranteed long-term hold: they don’t believe in “buy and never look again.”
• Reject with conviction; select with doubt:
  • Rejection reasons are clear.
  • Holding/selection includes valuation and management doubts.
• “Good = absence of bad” (Japanese saying referenced).
• Asymmetric learning & discipline:
  • Don’t waste time explaining what’s bad—focus on rejecting it.
• Prepare for short-term reassessment:
  • Insiders can explain quarter guidance, but long-term outlook becomes wide-range guessing.

Client/disclosure/disclaimer

• They state: “Not financial advice.” (They say “This is not a recommendation to buy” when discussing Ather.)
• Final disclaimer shown:
  • “Investment in securities market are subject to market risks. Read all the related documents carefully before investing.”

Presenters / sources mentioned

• Dinshaw Irani (Managing Director & CEO, Helios)
• Interview host: (name appears as “Shi” / “Shi for having me on your show”; full name unclear due to subtitles)
• Video platform/source: India Opportunity Show (channel/segment referenced)