中小企業論ゲスト講演　株式会社山共　田口房国氏

Business summary (company + strategy shift)

• Presenter/Company context: Taguchi (Yamakyo Co., Ltd.) describes a family lumber/forestry group (sawmill + forestry operations) based in Higashi-Shirakawa Village, Gifu—a very small area (~2,000 people), with ~90% forest cover and limited infrastructure (no convenience stores, traffic lights, or temples).
• Initial problem: Traditional forestry/timber models were becoming unsustainable due to:
  • Cost pressure vs. added-value constraints: Forestry economics typically force a choice between lower costs (efficiency) or higher timber value; without subsidies, it’s hard to operate profitably.
  • Landowner disengagement: Owners stop visiting and maintaining forests, causing abandonment, empty houses, and a growing belief that “the mountains aren’t needed anymore.”

Earlier turnaround (lumber business play)

• When Taguchi became a third-generation president at around 30 years old, he:
  • Re-equipped the mill (new machinery),
  • Developed new products,
  • Expanded customers beyond local carpenters to Nagoya, Kanto, and overseas.
• Result: a V-shaped performance recovery.

Failed forestry attempt leading to reset

• Taguchi founded a forestry company (Yamakist) aiming to be subsidy-independent via:
  • Mechanization,
  • Safety and work-condition improvements,
  • Procedure changes,
  • Buying local forests.
• This effort resulted in losses and internal friction with field workers; he later stepped down.

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New business creation: Forest “Rental Service” (access-as-a-service)

What he launched

• Taguchi launched what’s described as Japan’s first forest rental service (“Forest Mental Service” appears to be a transcription error; the concept is clear: rental/access to forest plots).

Trigger for founding (opportunity recognition)

• COVID-19 canceled weekend events, giving him time to watch camping content (including wild camping).
• He noticed a risk in the “own a mountain” model bought online:
  • Remote owners may be unable to manage daily,
  • Hard to sell later,
  • Ownership and rules can be unclear,
  • Complications with Google listings/local regulations,
  • After disasters (heavy rain/landslides), rescue/response responsibilities become difficult.

Core innovation

• Instead of selling ownership, the service enables people to rent forest plots, so:
  • Locals preserve continuity and control,
  • Users can access nature frequently without ownership complexity.

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Service design & operating model

Location/asset strategy

• Started from his family holdings: inherited about 400 hectares, scattered into parcels.
• Chose a relatively accessible area with gentle slopes near a road.
• Parceling: divided into plots of about 300 tsubo (roughly 30m × 30m).

Pricing & contract (simple, low friction)

• Annual rental contract: 66,000 yen/year (about 5,000 yen/month), renewable.
• Minimal facilities: no electricity or running water; no formal check-in—users can access anytime.
• Operational philosophy: removing check-in duties eliminates the biggest cost and makes it feasible as a side business during downtime.

Rules/terms (risk allocation)

• Temporary toilet only; no trash left behind.
• Users assume responsibility for:
  • Theft/animals (e.g., wild boar, serow),
  • Any incidents that occur.

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Marketing & GTM playbook (how demand was validated)

Positioning & demand capture

• Used content creators and media exposure:
  • Asked a Gifu camping YouTuber (name noted as “Koko wa Survival Kamo na”, ~500k subs mentioned) to advise/promote.
  • Used a press release platform (PCR Times) to reach TV/newspapers/radio/music outlets.

Launch timeline

• Recruitment began Nov 1, 2020.
• Project took about 3 months to open.

Initial demand test + pricing assumption

• He expected about 17 enthusiasts would sign up.
• Advertising ran for one month, resulting in 440 entries—around 25× the expectation.

Operational adjustment after underestimation

• The initial plan assumed a manageable “open house”/joint viewing flow.
• Since entries were too high for direct tours:
  • He rented a nearby park for reception,
  • Used a minibus from a nearby inn,
  • Staff acted like tour guides during shuttle trips.

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Metrics & business economics (explicit KPIs)

Adoption / scale

• Began with 1 mountain (his own).
• Scaled to:
  • 77 plots rented by the broader community (as of the talk),
  • Later figure: 117 plots in the Higashi-Shirakawa area (transcription suggests a current number; context indicates growth).
• Rentals continue throughout the year via annual contracts.

Pricing KPI

• 66,000 yen/year per plot.

Timber/forestry profitability comparison (unit economics)

• Traditional forestry profitability (quoted):
  • About ~500,000 yen profit over 50–60 years per hectare, which is annualized as roughly ~8,000+ yen/year (the annualized figure is stated with some transcription ambiguity).
• New approach (rental-based economics):
  • About ~400,000–500,000 yen profit per hectare per year, stated as roughly ~50× higher than ordinary forestry.
• Unit of value creation: forest rental is positioned as generating value from time/space (analog experience) rather than timber alone.

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Product differentiation frameworks (what makes it “work”)

Two-layer value logic

• Forestry continues (timber production),
• The rental service provides stable annual cash flow even when trees aren’t being cut.

Explicit “trend”/principles framework

• Open forest access to the general public.
• Shift mindset of forestry stakeholders and rural residents.
• Turn forest utilization into a cultivated culture (ongoing practice, not one-off tourism).

Differentiation (“originality”)

• Not built by Tokyo leisure/real-estate/IT firms.
• Built by a local countryside citizen who owns/understands forests, so he understands both:
  • Landowner anxieties,
  • User needs.

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Organizational tactics: franchise expansion (scaling operations)

• Franchise locations: 12 nationwide (as of talk time).
• Target/trajectory: 302 locations by end of August (year implied but not explicitly stated).
• Expansion described across Japan (e.g., Hokkaido → Kanto/Chubu/Kansai/Kyushu), with further plans underway.

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Concrete examples / case moments

Media proof

• Tokai TV coverage demonstrated user experience elements such as:
  • Spring water coffee,
  • Bonfire cooking,
  • Handmade items,
  • Use of a log house.

User feedback themes

• Want immersion without worrying about others.
• Enjoy building/creating from scratch.
• “Camping is an upgrade”—camping is framed as the starting point for enjoying the forest itself.

Observed behavior shift

Users gradually transform the plot:

• Build benches/tables from local/fallen wood,
• Create stoves,
• Build bridges, swings, zip-lines,
• Even begin building cabins.
• Operator conclusion: the service should not “create a city”; users co-create the experience.

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Actionable recommendations (implied from his experience)

• Don’t rely on subsidies as the core revenue engine.
  • Subsidy independence was the goal, but execution required better fit; he learned this lesson.
• Use a low-capex model with clear risk allocation:
  • Remove check-in to cut operational costs,
  • Keep contracts simple,
  • Define user responsibility for safety/theft/cleanup.
• Make GTM match operations:
  • Creator partnerships + press releases can exceed expectations,
  • Plan capacity and logistics (reception + shuttle tours).
• Turn side-business constraints into design rules:
  • Anytime access, minimal facilities,
  • Annual contracts reduce admin churn.

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High-level market / investing note (minimal)

• Taguchi frames the rental service as creating a new market for analog experiences.
• As digitalization/AI expands leisure time, people will pay for time/space in nature—especially where traditional timber value alone can’t sustain forestry.

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Presenters / sources

• Presenter: 田口房国 (Taguchi) of 株式会社山共 / Yamakyo Co., Ltd.
• He also references related forestry and forest-rental brand/company activities connected to the family group.