Video Summary - Chance of Taiwan, China Reunification is ‘Nil’

Bilahari Kausikan: Competition is normal, turbulence is not “new”

Bilahari Kausikan (former Singapore Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs) argues that today’s international turbulence—wars (Ukraine, Gaza), U.S.–China strategic rivalry, and other conflicts—should not be treated as historically unusual. Competition and conflict are portrayed as inherent features of international relations, and the “post–Cold War brief exception” (roughly the two decades after the Berlin Wall) has been mistaken as the norm.

Framework: “Competition within a system,” not a new Cold War

Kausikan rejects the “new Cold War” trope. He argues the U.S. and China are not existentially trying to replace each other’s entire system (as the U.S. and USSR did), because modern economies are “mixed” and globally interdependent.

He says the defining feature of the current era is the extreme complexity of 21st-century supply chains—likened to a “forest/tree roots” network rather than a simple linear chain. He argues that full bifurcation—even in sensitive sectors like semiconductors—is unrealistic because both sides remain deeply economically embedded (e.g., China’s large share of global semiconductor demand/market).

China and the U.S. in perspective

Kausikan offers a balanced view:

China
- Has serious structural problems, especially fiscal imbalance tied to local government finances and demographics.
- Xi Jinping’s governance prioritizes party control; reform has not delivered promised market-oriented efficiency and control has tightened.
- Xi is described as “mediocre at governance” but effective at consolidating power.
- He rejects the idea of “peak China,” arguing growth can slow yet continue for a long time.
The U.S.
- U.S. politics is described as dysfunctional/polarized.
- He argues American strengths often lie outside Washington—civil society, corporations, research, universities, and local civic life.

Risk management: conflict is more about accidents than design

While high-intensity competition will recur, Kausikan says the danger is not “war by design,” but conflict by miscalculation/accident. He emphasizes nuclear deterrence, arguing nuclear weapons have prevented direct U.S.–China war (as they did U.S.–Soviet war). He also suggests proxy involvement is less likely to escalate than many fear.

Taiwan: “Voluntary reunification is nil,” but force could be compelled

On Taiwan, Kausikan argues reunification is not politically plausible because Taiwanese public support for extremes (independence or reunification) is low; most favor the status quo. He says China is unlikely to gamble on war because losing would threaten regime survival and party rule.

However, he identifies two scenarios where China “must fight”:

If Taiwan credibly pursues nuclear weapons (a low-probability but high-impact scenario)
- Nuclear threshold capability would undermine the Communist Party’s legitimacy narrative around reunification.
If Taiwanese domestic politics shifts beyond “red lines” short of formal independence, driven by identity and sovereignty claims
- Beijing is allegedly unsure in advance what exactly constitutes those red lines.

Long-term concerns in Taiwan

He flags longer-term risks tied to Taiwan’s preparedness and attitudes:

A perceived decline in elite willingness to defend themselves, with conscription/training time criticized as insufficient.
A rise in entitlement/expectation that others will help Taiwan.

What happens “next”

He implies the near-term equilibrium can persist (status quo managed), but that Taiwan’s internal trajectory—and any move toward a nuclear capability—could destabilize it significantly.

Gaza: no solution—only management; regional priorities lie elsewhere

Kausikan characterizes Gaza as the “international problem par excellence” with no workable solution, only management. He argues the conflict is “ill-managed,” and that major regional Arab governments deprioritize Palestinians due to other strategic priorities:

After 1979, the dominant concern for Gulf monarchies is Iran (including regime-type threats), not the Palestinian issue.
He portrays the Abraham Accords as functioning in practice as an anti-Iran alignment, explaining why participating Arab states have not abandoned them despite Gaza’s casualties.

Israel/Palestinian politics and the two-state challenge

He argues many key actors do not want a two-state solution because it would undermine their incentives/power structures and could trigger political disaster (compared to a new “Nakba”).

He also says a two-state process lacks stable foundation because Israel currently struggles to deter non-state actors (Hamas/Hezbollah etc.). Gaza’s war dynamics make restoring deterrence harder, reducing prospects for a viable two-state pathway.

“Keeping myths credibly alive”

In a Q&A exchange, Kausikan frames diplomacy as involving the credible maintenance of certain assumptions—such as reunification myths for Taiwan and two-state myths for Gaza—to prevent drastic unilateral moves.

Gaza spillover and the next Middle East war: likely about Iran, not Palestine

Asked whether Gaza could broaden into a larger regional conflict, he says:

Lebanon/Egypt are unlikely to become major drivers of escalation.
- Egypt is hostile to Hamas.
- Lebanon is fragmented and “not really a country anymore.”
Gaza will likely remain subregional and could spread mainly by accident, not by deliberate grand strategy.

Despite this, he argues that a major Middle East war is likely eventually, but it would be fought over Iran’s nuclear capability, not Palestine.

He also notes that Hezbollah and Israel appear to be “conserving” forces. Earlier Israel–Hezbollah exchanges are described as relatively limited “performance art,” not full-scale war preparation. He suggests pressure could rise if Iran’s deterrence/strike failures imply nuclear capability becomes the most attractive strategic hedge.

Southeast Asia: “not taking sides,” misunderstood

Several questions focus on neutrality and regional agency. Kausikan argues Southeast Asian “not taking sides” is often misunderstood:

Countries like Singapore have “taken sides” in security (aligned with the West/US for defense needs).
In other domains (political issues, speech norms, etc.) alignment may differ.
Economically, Southeast Asia is “promiscuous,” engaging multiple partners because competition is complex and allows agency.

He says this strategy is sustainable as long as countries do not panic or lose confidence in their own room for maneuver.

Philippines in the South China Sea: risk from misplaced reliance

On the Philippines’ positions (Second Thomas Shoal) and the Philippines–China–U.S. triangle, Kausikan argues the Philippines may have placed too much trust in U.S. guarantees:

The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty is described as misleadingly titled and limited in scope.
There was an implicit resupply/rebuild distinction that has been strained:
- The Philippines wants to rebuild; China objects.
- The U.S. has created conditional/political commitments that may not translate into unconditional military backing.
He argues both sides are “cornered,” but large-scale conflict is still unlikely; the dispute is not “important enough” for Washington or Beijing to trigger war—though it is the most immediate flashpoint in Southeast Asia.

U.S. election and Taiwan: uncertainty under Trump-style policy

Asked about the impact of a potential Trump presidency on Taiwan, Kausikan says he does not know because personnel and factional dynamics matter:

Trump previously made a contentious Taiwan call, then reaffirmed One China later—suggesting internal faction competition.
He implies any future Trump approach is unlikely to match Biden’s repeated “defend Taiwan” signals; at minimum, Taiwan should worry about weaker, less certain commitments.

Presenters/Contributors

Bilahari Kausikan (speaker; former Singapore Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ambassador to Russia mentioned in introduction)
Uzmi (questioner; India)
Nitin (questioner; journalist based in Japan)
Selina (questioner; Taiwan’s Common Wealth Magazine)
Mia (questioner; South China Morning Post, Hong Kong)
Markus (appears to be “Hassif” questioner; Bangladesh; Channel 24)
Additional audience questioners whose names/affiliations are unclear due to subtitle errors

Chance of Taiwan, China Reunification is ‘Nil’ – What Happens Next?

Key takeaways