Δ. Τσιριγώτης: Καταρρέει η νεοφιλελεύθερη διεθνής τάξη λόγω του εθνικισμού

Summary

Dionysis Tsirigotis argues that the postwar, US-led international order is under strain. He says nationalist reactions are helping undermine the neoliberal project of spreading Western political models.

Suez and the changing international order

The 1956 Suez Crisis marked Britain’s decline as a global guarantor and the rise of the United States. Tsirigotis cautions that history does not repeat exactly, but says states’ bureaucratic behavior can recur. He suggests the US may now be less willing or able to provide security in the Middle East, including protecting key shipping routes.

Limits of the neoliberal order

Drawing on arguments about hegemonic stability and the predicted decline of the liberal international order, Tsirigotis says a leading power must provide shared benefits such as security and freedom of navigation.

He argues that imposing liberal political models on societies with different histories and social structures can produce fragile or failed states. He cites Iraq after the 2003 invasion and Syria as examples, and emphasizes Iran’s deep historical and cultural roots. In his view, such interventions can strengthen nationalism rather than create pro-Western societies.

Military power and political results

The United States retains major technological advantages and the ability to project power globally. However, Tsirigotis distinguishes that capability from “strategic effectiveness”—the ability to turn military superiority into political outcomes.

He says powerful states have often lost conflicts against weaker opponents, citing a figure of roughly 62–65% over the past two centuries. In his view, direct attacks on leadership may not defeat resilient, decentralized societies. Opponents such as Iran and the Houthis can instead use asymmetric retaliation, imposing repeated costs and threatening strategic waterways in ways that disrupt the global economy.

Risks around Iran

Tsirigotis describes the US and Iran as both using coercive diplomacy. For it to work, threats must be credible, objectives clearly defined, and a diplomatic exit available to both sides. He argues that US goals have been unclear or contradictory.

He outlines three possible outcomes: an agreement, a prolonged frozen conflict, or an unpredictable escalation that could spread across the region.

Russia, the United States, and Europe

Tsirigotis does not see a lasting US–Russia strategic partnership emerging. He suggests that current contacts could instead lead to a pragmatic understanding over spheres of influence, with US attention focused primarily on China.

He interprets Russia’s actions in Ukraine partly through its security concerns and NATO’s eastward expansion, while noting that Europe has limited influence over decisions made between Washington and Moscow.

Europe’s vulnerabilities

European countries face energy dependence, high costs, and pressure on households, while lacking a unified foreign and defence policy. Tsirigotis identifies France, Germany, and the UK as especially consequential, but says Europe generally follows US policy.

He argues that shifting resources toward defence adds to pressure on Europe’s social model and contributes to public unrest. He connects these tensions to a crisis of European identity and a renewed emphasis on national identity over supranational integration.

Presenters and contributors

• Dionysis Tsirigotis — guest and commentator.
• Argyris — interviewer and presenter; the subtitles do not make his surname clear.