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Bilahari Kausikan: On Keeping Perspective in Volatile Geopolitical Times

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Overview: “Loss of perspective” in geopolitics

Secretary Bilahari Kausikan argued that much of today’s geopolitics is misunderstood because governments, firms, journalists, and academics focus too narrowly on events and then apply oversimplified interpretations. He urged developing “perspective” grounded in processes and history to avoid both overreaction and underreaction—especially in managing volatility.

Core framework: avoid “loss of perspective”

1) Foreign policy of words vs deeds

Drawing on Singapore’s Mr. S. Rajaratnam, he emphasized that countries need:

  • Ideals (“words”)
  • Practical survival diplomacy (“deeds”)

Confusing the two, he warned, is “suicidal.”

2) Events vs processes

Analysts often respond to headlines rather than the underlying processes that generate events. Losing perspective causes cyclical corrections, which increases instability.

3) Binary thinking is misleading

In wars and great-power competition, asking “who won or lost” at one moment is too simplistic. These contests are ongoing processes, and outcomes can reverse.

4) “International order” is theological, not objective

He described “rules-based order” and similar concepts as highly subjective:

  • Different actors prioritize different “rules.”
  • Different actors interpret them differently.

Therefore, lamenting the rupture of a particular order often misunderstands that no single order has been universally accepted.

Example: theology vs practical diplomacy (Canada at Davos)

He criticized Prime Minister Mark Carney’s claim that the international order has ruptured and that middle powers should unite to uphold it. Kausikan pointed to a contradiction:

  • Middle powers can’t deter Russia or balance China without at least minimal U.S. backing.
  • If the U.S. willingness to uphold the order is in doubt, middle powers can’t replace it through values-based coalitions alone.
  • Deeper point: “order” is not a law of nature; states choose what kind of order to believe in.

Why instability is not new

  • He argued the current heightened conflict risk is inherent to international relations, not an abnormal departure.
  • He described the relatively calmer post–Cold War period (roughly ~20 years) as exceptional, shaped by specific conditions:
    • Post-Soviet Russia’s weakness
    • China “biding time”
    • U.S. dominance
  • He noted that even U.S. moves like trade liberalization served strategic purposes—binding allies during existential competition with the USSR—an approach that cannot be simply recreated now.

U.S.–China relations: durable competition and unstable “deal cycles”

  • He said global media framed the recent Trump–Xi summit as win/lose, including claims that Trump was “bamboozled.”
  • His view: both sides treat U.S.–China rivalry as durable strategic competition, so agreements are meant to stabilize temporarily, not resolve the competition.
  • Expect the pattern to persist:
    • Deals ease tensions periodically
    • They likely “fall apart,” returning rivalry to higher-intensity phases

Iran conflict: not a “waste of time,” but a phase change

He challenged narratives portraying the Iran war/operations as futile or as merely ending negotiations. His position:

  • The conflict has been a shadow war since the early 2000s, cycling between shadow and kinetic phases.
  • The present period is likely only a phase ending, not a final settlement.

Changes that altered reality

  • Iran’s economic fragility deepened; internal stability remains brittle (including harsh measures such as executions after ceasefire announcements).
  • Gulf distrust intensified, including:
    • Saudi/UAE participation in kinetic attacks on Iran
    • Reciprocal Iranian attacks
  • Balance-of-power lesson: he argued effective balance against Iran rests mainly on the U.S. and Israel, and Gulf states will likely reach the same conclusion.

Strategic mistakes on both sides

  • U.S./Israeli side: repeatedly shifting goals (e.g., regime change vs nuclear-related goals vs variants) undermines clear assessment and hardens Iranian resistance.
  • Iran’s side: “closing of the Strait/ Hormuz” can be played effectively only once; it would trigger costly but feasible bypass solutions (pipelines/ports).

Iran’s nuclear direction

Once a state believes it needs nuclear capability, ambitions can’t be erased—only delayed. Diplomacy failed in his telling, including Iran’s long history of misleading the IAEA.

Regional consequences: Middle East stability depends on the U.S.–Israel balance

  • He argued the Middle East is not resetting into harmony; instead, stability increasingly depends on the U.S.–Israel military balance against Iran.
  • He also suggested regime change is not guaranteed to produce “better” governance; even if the theocratic leadership is weakened, the outcome could be more militarized and uncertain.

Southeast Asia example: pragmatic alignment

He pointed to Indonesia as evidence that middle powers can cooperate pragmatically despite religious and political sensitivities:

  • During the war period, Indonesia pursued a defense cooperation agreement with the U.S. even while fighting another Muslim country—demonstrating pragmatism rather than theology-based alignment.

Q&A highlights: policy implications for specific countries

Philippines and the South China Sea (China claim)

  • The dispute isn’t solvable through “international law” alone; the real requirement is balance of power.
  • The Philippines won’t be compelled to surrender its claim given U.S. naval presence (a stalemate exists), though China can still obstruct in practice.
  • He criticized a strategic misstep: bringing China to arbitration without a plan for next steps and without sufficient military capability to handle asymmetry (China can disregard Philippine forces more easily than Vietnam’s).

Advice: build military capability and ensure U.S./allied presence. There’s no “military solution,” but deterrence and credibility matter.

Impact on Pakistan

  • Pakistan’s diplomatic rehabilitation with the U.S. may improve U.S. perceptions, but it doesn’t fix core problems.
  • He described Pakistan as near failure due to economic mismanagement and jihadist violence/outgrowth.
  • He implied U.S. restrictions likely won’t be fully lifted because Pakistan contains groups not aligned with U.S. interests.

Bottom line: diplomatic success won’t automatically “feed” Pakistan’s domestic stabilization needs.

Indonesia/ASEAN non-alignment

  • He rejected neutrality/equidistance as an illusion.
  • ASEAN “middle ground” means aligning with interests as they shift.
  • On ASEAN “centrality,” he argued that repeating the phrase won’t create centrality; it is “theology” unless grounded in real strategic capability and realities.

Russia–Ukraine war (Central Asia concerns)

  • He predicted the war likely won’t end with a definitive settlement.
  • The best outcome would be a de facto stalemate/armistice akin to a Korea-style divided outcome.
  • He argued neither side can afford to give up territory:
    • Russia cannot concede politically
    • Ukraine cannot risk losing territory without domestic backlash
  • Central Asia—especially Kazakhstan (demographics and proximity)—should expect long-term risk management rather than quick resolution.

Iran-related maritime chokepoints (Strait of Hormuz / economic geography)

  • He said Iran’s “closing” capability functions effectively only once.
  • He predicted bypass investments:
    • Infrastructure via Oman (not Yemen)
    • Broader diversification of oil sourcing (e.g., Japan/South Korea buying more U.S. oil; China diversifying “in all directions”)
  • Therefore, the global economy will adapt; reliance on the chokepoint should reduce over time.

U.S.–Israel tension over an Iran MOU

  • He downplayed immediate impact, arguing the MOU is vague and won’t last.
  • Despite distrust, he said the U.S. and Israel remain “stuck together” due to mutual strategic reliance.

China’s global investment constraints and M&A risks

  • Investors can’t “navigate away” from risk; they must be aware and agile.
  • He used examples such as the Panama port case (and Qualcomm-like reversals) to illustrate regulatory uncertainty and risk signaling in China’s control model.

China’s economic outlook (10 years)

  • He said China likely won’t collapse but will likely experience suboptimal performance due to a contradiction:
    • A Leninist control system vs.
    • The needs of an efficiency/innovation-driven economy
  • He argued the model is moving toward more control, creating inefficiencies and uncertainty.
    • High-tech may do relatively well
    • Overall growth and domestic consumption rebalancing are unlikely to fully fix the problem
  • He cited “confidence” issues and political oscillation risk (“black swans”), while expecting continued adaptation rather than systemic collapse.

India as a balance against China

  • India plays a balancing role but not decisively, because it has its own constraints and priorities (Indian Ocean focus).
  • He did not see India replacing the U.S. as the core balancer, though it can contribute via exercises, defense cooperation, and selective capacity.

Presenters / contributors

  • Secretary Bilahari Kausikan — Speaker; former Permanent Secretary, Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  • Moderator/introducer — Unnamed in subtitles (speaker reserved “the last word” for Kausikan)

Questioners (as stated in subtitles)

  • Rudwig — Manila Times (Philippines)
  • Jendra — New Indian Express (New Delhi)
  • Fatima Nadesh — DW (Deutsche Welle)
  • Cecilia — NHK Jakarta Bureau
  • (Name not clearly stated) — Chikit Media (Kyrgyzstan; founder/head)
  • Zumar — Dawn (Pakistan)
  • Amanda — Wall Street Journal (Singapore)
  • Elliot — Capital Forum / formerly Financial Times and Wall Street Journal (Beijing/Hong Kong)
  • Rupali Mukharji — Times of India (Delhi)
  • Additional short interruptions / multiple “ma’am” turns — other audience members present but not clearly identified in subtitles

Original video