Dollo Ado: Building Refugee Economies

Summary of Video Subtitles: “Dollo Ado: Building Refugee Economies”

The video argues that the traditional refugee camp model—designed for emergency relief (food, shelter, and basic needs)—fails over the long term. Refugees often remain in camps for many years or even decades, and without the right to work or freedom of movement, people become trapped in “limbo.” This includes individuals born in camps who grow up without meaningful opportunities.

The video highlights Dollo Ado, Ethiopia, where Somali refugees arrived in large numbers (2009–2011). Government and international agencies established humanitarian camps near Dolo Ado, with the concern that these camps could become like other long-term, stagnant camps worldwide.

IKEA Foundation’s Alternative Approach

To prevent long-term dependency, the IKEA Foundation (the philanthropic arm of IKEA) invested about $100 million over seven years, working with the UN and the Ethiopian government.

The approach shifted from only managing vulnerabilities toward building refugees’ and host communities’ capacities, aiming for gradual economic integration and sustainable livelihoods—including access to work and education.

Impact Evaluation Focus

An impact evaluation was conducted (last year) to learn from both successes and failures. Rather than assuming everything worked or failed, the evaluation used results to improve future refugee assistance.

Key Innovation: Cooperatives for Livelihoods

Around 2015, the program focus shifted toward livelihoods through membership-based cooperatives that included equal numbers of refugees and host community members. Members received vocational training and access to inputs, with the expectation that external support could later be reduced and incomes could become sustainable.

Cooperatives covered sectors such as:

• Agriculture
• Livestock
• Energy/environment
• Microfinance (noted as part of the cooperative framework)

Agriculture Results (Linked to Irrigation)

A major barrier to farming was limited access to water. IKEA financed irrigation infrastructure, including:

• 29 km of irrigation canals
• enabling about 1,000 hectares of irrigated land

This supported cooperative plots for roughly 1,000 refugee and 1,000 host community members.

Crops included:

• onions
• maize
• tomatoes
• watermelons

Reported outcomes:

• 87% of refugee cooperative members reported higher incomes
• refugee households farming through cooperatives reportedly earned around $100/month
• non-economic gains: higher self-esteem and improved refugee–host relationships

Agriculture: Limitations and Why Income Didn’t Catch Up

Despite job creation (about 1,000 new refugee jobs), the income impact was described as limited compared to camp populations.

A comparison found cooperative farmers earned less than refugees farming outside cooperatives (about $50/month more for non-cooperative farmers). The video attributes this gap to:

• cooperatives being more risk-averse and focusing on staple crops
• weaker market reach, with cooperatives selling mostly within camps rather than broader regional/national markets

Livestock Value Chain: Stronger Market Links

The video presents livestock cooperatives as more successful due to a value-chain model with market linkages on both sides:

• High demand: refugees and hosts regularly consume meat and milk
• Stronger market connection: Dololo Ado’s livestock market links to regional markets, with potential export to Somalia and Kenya

Participants in meat-selling cooperatives reportedly experienced higher income and consumption, along with improved relationships with hosts.

The program also notes supply-side design based on existing skills and experience. It further mentions that over 95% of households rely on firewood for cooking, leading into the next example.

Energy/Firewood Cooperative: A Failed Example

Women who previously traveled far for firewood faced risks including sexual and gender-based violence. They formed cooperatives to use prosopis (an invasive species) as an alternative fuel by:

• importing prosopis into camps
• converting it into charcoal briquettes

Unlike the livestock approach, this effort is described as not working due to:

• weak market linkages (not enough buyers for briquettes)
• higher-than-expected production costs
• a rapid increase in prosopis prices

Many members returned to traditional firewood collection because they could not earn a living through briquettes.

Overall Conclusions

The video claims the work in Dollo Ado is unprecedented in applying private-sector investment to market-based development in a refugee-hosting region. It concludes that the programs:

• measurably improved incomes and living standards for thousands
• demonstrated the feasibility of collaboration between the UN and private sector
• showed it is possible to build sustainable economies even in remote areas
• supports reimagining refugee assistance beyond camp life

At the same time, it emphasizes ongoing challenges:

• average income levels remain low
• very few refugees/hosts have fully independent income-generating activities
• some programs did not achieve intended outcomes

The intended takeaway is that future refugee assistance should combine “what worked,” “what didn’t,” and lessons from evaluation to improve refugee lives globally.

Presenters / Contributors (as named in subtitles)

• IKEA Foundation (organization)
• United Nations (UN) (organization)
• Ethiopian government (organization)
• No individual presenter names are provided in the subtitles.