Seyed M. Marandi: Plans for a U.S. Land Invasion of Iran; Yemen & Iran Enters the War?

Overview

Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi argues that the United States has renewed and is escalating its campaign against Iran. He warns that the conflict could widen as Yemen becomes involved, increasing risks to shipping and regional stability—particularly in the Red Sea and given Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability.

Marandi frames the fighting as part of a broader strategy to pressure Iran economically and strategically, centered on controlling and disrupting key maritime routes, especially the Strait of Hormuz.

Why the war escalated (Marandi’s interpretation)

• After a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed, Marandi contends Iran did not expect the U.S. to fully carry out its commitments.
• He claims the MOU still allowed Iran, during a brief window, to export oil and import critical supplies, because U.S. siege/constraints had temporarily eased enough for tankers to move.
• Marandi argues the U.S. then undermined the agreement through multiple violations, including:
  • refusing to return Iranian assets,
  • refusing other political/military commitments,
  • expanding sanctions,
  • reversing parts related to Iranian oil exports,
  • maintaining a form of siege.
• He further claims the U.S. opened a separate “corridor” in violation of Article 5 of the MOU—effectively attempting to bypass or weaken Iran’s recognized authority over trade.
• When Iran warned tankers against using the U.S.-facilitated corridor, Marandi says U.S.-backing states sent tankers anyway. He argues that Iran then struck several tankers, prompting the U.S. to bomb Iran—fully collapsing the MOU in his view.

What Iran is aiming to do now

• Marandi says Iran’s strikes are intended to keep the Strait of Hormuz constrained until the U.S. fulfills its obligations—“in practice,” until Iran’s demands are met (including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, ending attacks on Gaza, and returning assets).
• He argues the conflict is essentially “a war over the Strait of Hormuz,” not merely local strikes.
• Iran’s targeting focus (as described by Marandi) includes:
  • Bahrain and Kuwait, where U.S. assets for a potential ground invasion are allegedly concentrated
  • other U.S./regional-linked targets in places such as Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, and Oman
• He claims Iran has improved missile/drone effectiveness, including introducing a new missile type, and counters U.S. strikes with:
  • dispersion,
  • deep underground infrastructure that is harder to destroy.

Military feasibility and alleged U.S. plans

• Marandi emphasizes that U.S. efforts to destroy Iranian targets are difficult because Iranian systems are dispersed and fired from concealed underground positions.
• He argues U.S. bombing patterns are consistent with preparation for a land invasion, especially against Kuwait and Bahrain.
• However, he doubts timing and feasibility, arguing that:
  • extreme heat and humidity would make a near-term land operation especially dangerous,
  • U.S. troops’ morale and equipment conditions would be worse now than later.
• He suggests late September/after would be more plausible for the U.S., though he says Iran is preparing regardless.

Yemen’s relevance

Marandi argues Yemen (along with Iraq) matters not just symbolically but geographically:

• Yemen could disrupt Red Sea commerce by striking supertankers—he notes that even a single hit could cause major insurance/shipping disruptions.
• Yemen could also target Saudi oil/energy assets, potentially harming Saudi exports significantly.

He connects Yemen’s escalation to a broader pattern of U.S.-Saudi-West actions during Yemen’s blockade, which he describes as “genocidal” and compares to Gaza.

Marandi also says Iranian and Yemeni tensions intensified after the U.S./Saudi allegedly bombed Sana’a airport, putting an Iranian plane at risk and endangering Yemeni civilians—raising the odds of wider Red Sea disruption.

Iraq’s role in escalation and proxy warfare

• Marandi argues the U.S. uses proxy militant groups in northern Iraq (including Kurdish extremist groups) and other external terror networks (e.g., in Pakistan’s Balochistan).
• He says these groups lack capacity to decisively alter the conflict.
• If a land operation occurs, he argues the U.S. would likely conduct it itself rather than relying on those groups—making Iraq more of an enabling battlefield than a decisive actor.

Global economic outlook and oil supply constraints

Regarding whether the U.S. can “buy time” before global shortages worsen:

• Marandi says earlier oil relief (tankers already loaded leaving the Persian Gulf) was temporary and not sustainable.
• He argues that even if about ~20 million barrels/day reportedly left during a short window, closures rapidly recreate severe shortages.
• He predicts that if the Strait remains shut, the global economic impact will worsen day by day and could become destabilizing enough to push conditions toward a depression-like scenario.

Diplomacy: why it’s unlikely to resume soon

• Marandi argues Iranian politics is more united now than in the immediate post-MOU period, and he rejects claims that Iranian military actions are driven by only one faction.
• He asserts decisions require a mandate from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
• He says U.S. political divisions (including tensions between Trump and figures like J.D. Vance) and U.S. domestic resistance in Congress to war funding may constrain U.S. escalation—but he doubts diplomacy will produce quick results.
• His bottom line: Iran will not reopen/normalize the Strait without concrete U.S. action fulfilling Iran’s demands; “new paper” or vague statements will not be enough.

Final explanation for U.S. decision-making

• Marandi attributes U.S. risk-taking to “hubris,” “American exceptionalism,” and influence from Israeli/Zionist lobbying, arguing the U.S. is gambling it can control escalation.
• He suggests internal political resistance (especially from Democrats) reflects awareness of hidden realities, with media not fully informing the public.

Presenters / contributors

• Glenn (interviewer)
• Seyed Mohammad Marandi (Professor at Tehran University; former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team)