They forgot something BIG | Asiana Flight 214

Summary

Flight and crew

On July 6, 2013, Asiana Airlines Flight 214, a Boeing 777 carrying 291 passengers and 16 crew members, departed Seoul for San Francisco. The passengers included a group of 70 students and teachers traveling to a summer camp.

The flight had four pilots. The captain flying the approach was transitioning to the 777 from the Airbus A320 and had only 43 hours on the Boeing. The supervising captain was experienced, but was also new to the role of 777 training captain.

The pilots would make their landing in the early morning according to their body clocks, a time when fatigue can affect performance.

The approach becomes unstable

Construction had made the runway’s electronic glide slope unavailable. The localizer, which guides an aircraft left or right along the runway centerline, was still working, so the crew planned to use it for lateral guidance and judge the descent visually.

The video says Asiana’s pilots were accustomed to relying heavily on automation and received limited practice in manual flying and visual approaches. The pilot flying was unfamiliar with this type of 777 approach.

The crew was asked to maintain a relatively high speed until close to the runway. The aircraft became high and fast. The pilots were slow to configure it for landing and did not use available tools, such as speed brakes, to help lose altitude and speed.

While trying to correct the descent, the pilot adjusted the aircraft’s automation modes. At one point, he selected flight-level-change speed mode, which caused the aircraft to climb toward a selected altitude rather than continue descending. He disconnected the autopilot and brought the thrust levers to idle, leaving the autothrottle in HOLD—a mode in which it no longer controlled engine thrust.

Neither pilot clearly called out the mode changes. As a result, both believed the autothrottle was still managing the aircraft’s speed. The supervising captain also failed to reset his flight director, a step that would have returned the autothrottle to speed mode.

The missed chance to go around

Visual approach lights beside the runway showed that the aircraft was well above the desired glide path, but the approach continued.

The aircraft descended too quickly and later fell below the glide path. The pilot raised the nose in an effort to regain the correct path. With the engines still at idle, this reduced airspeed further instead of adding the power needed to recover.

At 500 feet, the approach did not meet all the stated criteria for a stable approach: the descent rate was too high, and engine thrust was still at idle. The video says the required 500-foot call and a decision to land or go around did not occur.

The crew recognized the danger only when the aircraft was very low and slow. The captain advanced the thrust levers, but the engines could not spool up quickly enough. The aircraft struck the sea wall short of the runway, lost its tail, hit the runway, and came to rest beside it.

Aftermath and safety lessons

Three passengers died. Forty people were seriously injured, including eight flight attendants and one flight crew member.

The pilots initially told a senior cabin crew member to stand by rather than immediately ordering an evacuation. A flight attendant who saw fire and smoke independently ordered passengers to evacuate; the narration credits this quick action with saving lives.

The NTSB investigation concluded that the crew relied too heavily on automation they did not fully understand, unintentionally disabled the autothrottle, and continued an approach outside acceptable speed and altitude tolerances rather than going around. Fatigue likely compounded these problems.

The video’s broader lessons are that automation requires clear training and monitoring, and that pilots must be prepared to fly manually. Standard procedures—including announcing automation-mode changes and making a timely go-around decision—are important safeguards, especially when an approach becomes unstable.

Automation concepts and approach safeguards

• Vertical-speed mode: The autopilot pitches the aircraft to achieve a selected climb or descent rate; engine thrust controls airspeed.
• Flight-level-change speed mode: The aircraft pitches to achieve the selected airspeed; engine thrust controls the climb or descent.
• HOLD mode: The autothrottle is disconnected from the thrust levers and no longer controls the aircraft’s speed or vertical path.
• Stable-approach checks: The aircraft should be on the correct path and speed, with the landing gear and flaps configured and the descent rate appropriate. If it does not meet the required criteria, the crew should go around.

The NTSB recommendations described in the video included enhanced training on automation modes, stricter adherence to standard operating procedures and mode-change callouts, and more manual-flying practice.

Speakers and sources featured

• Video narrator: The main speaker throughout, including a sponsored Opera browser segment.
• Flight-deck participants represented in the narration: The flying captain, supervising training captain, relief first officer, and air traffic controllers, through described or quoted cockpit and radio exchanges.
• Cabin crew represented in the narration: The senior cabin crew member and the flight attendant who ordered the evacuation.
• Sources referenced: The NTSB final investigation report; descriptions from the pilots’ colleagues; and a contract simulator instructor’s comments about Asiana pilots’ manual-flying practices.