Октябрь 1993 года: взгляд из расстрелянного Верховного Совета | Игорь Шишкин и Сергей Бабурин

Summary of Main Arguments and Commentary

The video is a discussion of the October 1993 events in Moscow (the clashes around the “House of Soviets” and its storming), presented from the perspective of politician Sergei Baburin, with host Igor Shishkin. The core thesis is that the events were not a spontaneous “fight between two sides,” but a presidential coup carried out by Boris Yeltsin, supported by parts of the state apparatus and by external Western backing. The interview also argues that many later narratives in Russia—especially claims that “nothing happened” or that it was “staged”—are renewed propaganda.

1) Legal-Political Characterization: “Coup d’état” and Removal from Office

Baburin frames October 1993 as the outcome of an unconstitutional presidential attempt to seize power:

• September 21, 1993 is described as the beginning: Baburin says Yeltsin issued decrees and actions that constituted an abuse of power.
• He claims the Constitutional Court (by majority vote) found sufficient grounds to remove the president.
• He also says the Congress of People’s Deputies decided to remove Yeltsin from office.
• By October 4, Baburin claims the president used military force after removal.

2) Why Yeltsin Allegedly Needed the Conflict: Privatization and Power

Baburin offers two main internal reasons:

1. Opposition of the Supreme Soviet/Congress to “thieves’ privatization.” He argues that parliament resisted voucher-based privatization and preferred a socially oriented approach, with proceeds controlled and distributed to citizens via personal accounts.

2. Fear that Soviet legal references would not be removed. He claims congress members fought to preserve constitutional references requiring citizens and officials to comply with USSR laws and the constitution. He portrays the December 1991 dissolution (Belovezh Accords) as contradicting that legal framework, calling it effectively a coup/treason.

3) Competing Narratives: “No Alternatives” vs. Revived Western/Liberal and Pseudo-Factual Claims

The discussion claims the official story has shifted over time:

• Baburin says earlier coverage and propaganda downplayed the conflict and framed it as justified, though some anniversary events allowed alternative interpretations.
• He argues that in recent years old liberal narratives have returned, including claims that there was “no shooting” and that events were “staged.”
• He disputes these claims and argues that the attempt to rehabilitate Yeltsin is built on “lies,” including references to former judges and public figures who, in his view, deny real violence.

4) Military Course of Events: Controlling Units and Violence from Yeltsin’s Side

Baburin portrays Yeltsin as unable to broadly defeat the army, but able to “tame” some formations:

• He claims Yeltsin relied on bribes (ranks, awards) to secure loyalty of certain units.
• He describes the early clash: machine-gun fire, armored vehicles arriving, and attackers allegedly firing on defenders—and even on those not directly involved in storming.
• He cites identifiable casualties and emphasizes that, in his account, an inquiry concluded that defenders of the House of Soviets were not killed or wounded by weapons fired from the House.

5) “External Factor”: U.S. Negotiations and Alleged Support

A major part of the argument concerns Western involvement:

• Baburin claims the U.S. declassified portions of negotiations between Clinton and Yeltsin, asserting Yeltsin sought “permission” and promised stabilization funding (he mentions $5 billion).
• He also alleges military support or facilitation, describing an incident at Sheremetyevo involving a plane with a “golf team,” which he says was not properly checked and was moved with Presidential Security Service escort.
• He argues these elements indicate that Yeltsin acted with strong Western political backing—and possibly operational help.

6) “Third Force” / Provocateurs (Snipers) and Contested Blame

Baburin argues that violence involved provocateurs, particularly snipers:

• He suggests shooters fired from rooftops/locations (including from the area of the “Ukraine Hotel”) at both defenders and attackers.
• He notes that definitive identification of who did it is allegedly still unresolved, but he presents this as a serious component of the conflict.

7) Personal Role and Institutional Aftermath (Imprisonment and Investigations)

Baburin presents himself as a legal and political figure who resisted Yeltsin:

• He says he was imprisoned and later released due to “no legal grounds,” describing questioning followed by a quick release.
• He claims that during later investigations the Office of the Prosecutor General concluded that defenders were not killed by weapons from the House of Soviets.
• He adds personal recollections of seeing dead bodies and being under fire, comparing the experience to his military experience in Afghanistan.

8) Outcome: Was There an Alternative? “Socially Oriented Privatization” and a “Chinese Path”

On whether resistance was justified and whether there “was no choice,” Baburin argues:

• Resistance was morally and politically justified because deputies had obligations to voters and a legal basis for removing Yeltsin.
• He says the compromise was to call early elections (both presidential and parliamentary/people’s deputies), allowing the public to decide.
• He argues an alternative existed to voucher privatization: socially oriented privatization with income distribution to citizens, which he compares to China’s reform trajectory (“Chinese path”).

9) Claim About Oligarchic Capitalism Arising from 1993

Baburin directly connects later oligarchic structures to the 1993 process:

• He claims Yeltsin’s supporters included brokers and business figures, mentioning Gusinsky, and later naming figures such as Gusinsky, Smolensky, Berezovsky.
• He argues oligarchic capitalism in Russia emerged largely through voucher privatization, enabling insider asset capture while preventing a controlled, broad distribution to citizens.

10) Consolidation with Later Political Events (1996 and Belarus)

Baburin adds additional parallels:

• He describes 1996 as a time when Yeltsin allegedly tried to “repeat” 1993, but a Duma resolution preserving the referendum outcome related to the Soviet Union helped prevent escalation.
• He describes negotiations involving Lukashenko, and says Kremlin officials feared Yeltsin might allow unification plans that could elevate Lukashenko into Russian leadership.

Presenters / Contributors

• Igor Shishkin — host
• Sergei Nikolaevich Baburin — guest; politician, deputy; legal theorist/constitutional law figure