Сухаревський: "Росіяни копіюють нас, але у них немає ініціативи"

Summary of the Video (news / commentary themes)

Vadim Sukharevskyi (deputy commander of OK East / operational command) explains how the Ukrainian army is evolving under full-scale war conditions, focusing on troop generation, military education, drone / “unmanned systems” development, and command-and-control reform.

1) War as a destabilizing “system convulsion” shaping everything

• He describes operational command responsibilities as combining legal duties with practical troop generation.
• In wartime, even previously stable “system” processes become unstable due to constant battlefield change and constraints on resources (both human and technical).
• Commanders across levels operate in a continuous cycle of decisions—training, administration, and reforms are shaped by that instability.

2) Training reforms and why “local evolution” matters

• Operational command training is described as a “thin line” between higher-level doctrinal education and the needs of subordinate units.
• Training centers evolve through:
  • ongoing interaction (“live communication”),
  • attempts to introduce innovations,
  • adaptive periods (e.g., BZVP units).
• Key friction points:
  • Resource delays, especially shelter-related needs—tasks may be assigned, but funding and materials can take months.
  • Flexibility and logistics often lag behind battlefield tempo.

3) Doctrinal education vs. rapid innovation in technology

• He distinguishes between:
  • doctrinal, stable education (strategic/operational planning; higher officer training),
  • field-level training that generalizes combat experience.
• For drones, he argues doctrine must ultimately be written and adapted, not merely “added on.”
• Europe vs. Ukraine (as portrayed):
  • Europe is characterized as discussion-heavy and bureaucratic (“paper-based” decisions).
  • The Baltics are described as more active.
  • Even when UAV concepts are tested in Europe, adoption is said to lag behind reality—“video/TikTok understanding” is viewed as insufficient compared to full system diagrams and operational integration.

4) Israel as an example of innovation tempered by pride / assumptions

• Sukharevskyi claims strong dialogue with Israeli counterparts (IDF / Tzahal), but argues Israelis struggle with pride—believing their superiority blocks learning.
• He references early “shock” experiences (e.g., responding to severe threats during ground operations) and suggests Israel’s adaptive learning cycle was slower than it could have been, despite the drone footage and apparent lessons.

5) Artillery vs drones: symbiosis, not replacement

• He rejects the claim that drones have fully replaced artillery.
• Core position: future warfare will involve long-term symbiosis—drones may dominate at certain stages, but classical fires (artillery / mortars) remain essential and will return as counter-drone capability grows (“battle for the sky”).
• He acknowledges tradeoffs (mortars may become shorter-lived under drone pressure), but argues artillery calibers should not be dismissed permanently.

6) Russia’s unmanned systems: strong structuring, but less initiative

• He argues Russia copied Ukrainian concepts quickly, but—at least in his view—does so through centralized, methodical “gray mass” processes rather than initiative-driven searching.
• Positive points attributed to Russia:
  • high unit freedom of action and internal communications,
  • systematic testing by troops and specialized provision of means,
  • better structuring / optimization (fewer variants; clearer integration cycles).
• Negative points attributed to Russia:
  • less maneuver space than Ukraine’s approach,
  • overreliance on replication rather than organic innovation.

7) Command reform and the “tactical group” problem

• He criticizes parts of Ukraine’s command-and-control reforms:
  • tactical groups may be created/disbanded and reassigned across directions (illustrated with an example in the Kramatorsk / Siversk context),
  • he views this as complexity and non-transparent trust relationships, not real simplification.
• He says, in principle, he prefers a clearer classic chain:
  • General Staff / operational commands for decision generation,
  • joint forces command / corps as warfighting elements.
• Still, he acknowledges reforms are “grinding in,” and implementation varies by commander’s habits and management style.

8) Role and organization of unmanned systems forces (SBS vs tactical levels)

• He supports the idea that the SBS (unmanned systems forces) should coordinate and synchronize battlefield processes—not only fight at tactical level.
• He claims his original unmanned-systems vision was more specialized:
  • Deep Strike / mid-strike,
  • synchronizing ammunition delivery to communications,
  • not pushing the concept broadly down every level.
• He notes today’s duplication and imbalance:
  • some units are affluent/innovative; others are constrained.
• He revisits a conceptual “distance-based” division he previously proposed:
  • up to ~30 km: brigade / corps level,
  • beyond: SBS / specialized units (SOF / GUR / Alpha, etc.).
• He argues drone funding should be coordinated under a single plan, similarly to traditional aviation allocation via liaison structures.

9) Tanks, armored vehicles, and “survival under drone saturation”

• Tanks are described as a frequent “sacrifice” in conditions where maneuver is limited and armor becomes a target; effective tank use is portrayed as rare.
• Future survivability depends on:
  • protection and active defense (not only weapons), including:
    • KAZ (active protection systems),
    • automated / AI-assisted turret systems that detect threats and engage.
  • Laser systems (e.g., “Trident”) are presented as promising mainly for drone defense and layered air defense concepts.

10) Autonomy and AI: useful planning, but no AI “final decision” for targeting

• Autonomy is described as a spectrum:
  • AI can help with analytics, processing sensor data, and routine HQ functions.
  • Ukraine should not allow AI to make the final lethal targeting decision (“Skynet” concern), for ethical and strategic reasons.
• He describes the innovation cycle as short at the front (about 3–6 months) and expects Russia to expand use of heavy bombers and UAV systems as digitalization improves.

11) Robotic ground systems and mechanized drone columns: optimistic but resource-limited

• He views unmanned ground systems (NRC) as positive and recalls early experience with robotic ground concepts.
• He supports the idea of “pushing the war away from the fighter” using robotic platforms for:
  • fire support,
  • engineering,
  • logistics,
  • kamikaze-style missions.
• Main limitation: low survivability and insufficient reserves / supply chains currently prevent large mechanized drone formations at scale.
• He predicts increasing saturation over time as survivability and support improve (including protection solutions like net launchers and KAZ / active defense).

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Presenters / contributors

• Vadim Sukharevskyi (deputy commander, OK East; guest)
• Host / interviewer (introducing the show “To Arms”; specific name not given in the subtitles)
• Yulia Kiriyenko (mentioned as preparing analysis/material)
• Andriy Lebedenko (mentioned as a brigadier general at a drone autonomy event)