КПРФ vs Новые Люди: за кого голосовать и кто реальная оппозиция?

Overview: Russia’s election system and “permitted” opposition

The speaker argues that Russia’s election system is deliberately designed to prevent genuine opposition. As an example, he points to the recent Supreme Court disqualification of the Yabloko party.

According to him, the case was “absurd” and politically motivated:

• A lawsuit brought by Rodina focused on copyright claims, including references he describes as oddly framed (e.g., to GPT and Marcus Aurelius).
• He claims the real goal was to clear the field for the “ruling establishment,” ensuring the outcome desired by the Kremlin / United Russia.
• He argues this demonstrates that election law and courts are structured to remove unwanted parties, especially those that might attract anti-war support.

Do elections “matter”?

The speaker addresses whether elections are meaningful. Although he acknowledges that many people view elections as pointless, he argues that authorities wouldn’t ban Yabloko if elections truly didn’t matter.

He presents this as evidence that voting can still be used strategically—specifically to reduce United Russia’s seat share in the State Duma.

How to vote (party-list strategy)

The presenter says he supports “smart voting” in districts (via a referenced bot), but emphasizes party-list voting.

He discourages:

• spoiling ballots
• voting for parties that might fail the 5% threshold

He cites past elections (notably 2021) to argue that votes that don’t clear the threshold are redistributed in a way that disproportionately benefits United Russia.

Why he prefers CPRF over other “systemic” parties

He argues that while the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is also a “systemic” party—its leadership is embedded within the Putin political framework—he sees CPRF as the best available option among parties that can pass 5% and thus meaningfully reduce United Russia’s representation.

Voting statistics on major initiatives

To support this, he uses voting statistics from the current Duma, focusing on contentious legislation such as:

• VAT increase
• “fake news” / army law
• pension reform
• bans / web regulation
• the “Yarovaya package”
• other high-conflict measures

He claims:

• United Russia supported these initiatives ~91% of the time
• CPRF supported them ~31%
• CPRF voted against in ~25% of cases
• By contrast, opposition from other parties (he mentions LDPR and New People) is described as near-zero

Political significance

Even if opposition within the system is limited, he argues that CPRF’s partial resistance is politically meaningful compared with factions that align almost entirely with the Kremlin.

Critique of other parties

LDPR

• Presented as a managed “opposition”
• Performs theatrically but, he claims, reliably votes with authorities
• He suggests LDPR leadership (under Slutsky) supports banning or limiting rivals like Yabloko

New People

• Described as a project closer to the urban/protest electorate and younger networks
• He argues they help authorities by absorbing real discontent without effectively representing it in parliament
• He frames them as capable of suppressing protest potential more effectively than they appear, even if they sometimes adopt anti-censorship rhetoric online

A Just Russia

• He implies it is even more pro-war than United Russia
• He references Mironov’s role in requesting Yabloko be removed

“Independence” within CPRF (regional actors)

While he calls CPRF leadership compromised, he argues the party’s regional structure can still produce more independent figures.

He cites:

• examples from Smart Voting 2021
• Nikolai Bondarenko as an emblem of CPRF’s ability to connect with real voter support

He also contrasts CPRF behavior with New People:

• CPRF is described as more willing to act in conflict situations (e.g., protests after alleged election manipulation in Moscow)
• New People is portrayed as less challenging after its 2024 campaign results

Main conclusion: vote because it affects seat distribution

He concludes that the purpose of elections is not fairness—he calls them dishonest and rigged—but rather that authorities fear participation because elections can unify people, and because voting affects how many mandates United Russia receives.

Since United Russia holds a large majority (he claims 324 seats) and can pass most legislation alone, he argues the realistic objective is:

• reduce United Russia’s mandates, not elect a “good Duma”

Call to action

• He urges voting for any party other than United Russia
  • to overcome the 5% barrier
  • to create maximum complications for United Russia’s dominance
• He says he personally votes for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation
• He frames Yabloko’s removal and the court’s actions as evidence that the Kremlin is actively shaping the “permitted” opposition

Presenters / contributors

• Ilya Gantg (speaker/host; sometimes described as “Ilya Ganfrog” in auto-subtitles)