Episode 6: Why Ukraine Is Doomed

Overview

John Mearsheimer argues that mainstream Western media and policymakers are using a misleading narrative about the war in Ukraine—claiming Russia is struggling while Ukraine is doing well. He contends the opposite: Russia is winning both on the battlefield and strategically, while Ukraine’s position is deteriorating, making the war’s trajectory bleak for Ukraine.

Main battlefield assessment (war of attrition)

• Russia’s manpower advantage is decisive:
  • He estimates Russia has a ~4.5:1 to 5:1 population advantage.
  • He estimates a ~2:1 to 3:1 advantage in frontline troops.
• Ukraine’s disadvantages are compounded by:
  • Draft dodging
  • “Awalls” (soldiers who flee the battlefield)
• Ukraine struggles to cover a very long front:
  • With a front length of roughly ~1,200 km, he argues Ukraine cannot maintain dense coverage, creating gaps.
  • He says drones partially compensate, helping plug gaps and delay Russian breakthroughs.

Weapons and firepower

• Russia’s artillery advantage remains decisive, and Ukraine is increasingly having difficulty obtaining artillery from the West.
• He claims Russia also maintains a large and sustained glide-bomb arsenal, citing estimates such as:
  • ~100,000 glide bombs launched since the war began
  • ~200 per day recently
• In contrast, he argues Ukraine has very few glide bombs.
• Drones are presented as the main balancing factor, helping prevent the war from ending sooner by reducing Ukraine’s manpower/firepower imbalance.

Casualty claims and casualty logic

• He disputes sensational claims that Russian conscripts die within 20–30 hours at the front, describing such numbers as exaggerated or ludicrous.
• He argues Russia fights methodically and slowly, using firepower to reduce casualties, rather than relying on reckless frontal assaults.
• However, he stresses that Ukrainian casualties remain very high, including a claim attributed to Budanov that Ukraine needs 30,000 new troops per month.
  • He uses this to argue Ukraine is losing—killed or severely wounded—on the order of tens of thousands monthly, implying hundreds of thousands of losses per year.
  • He frames this as a major strain on an already outnumbered army.

Why Russian advances are slow

• He argues Russia’s slow territorial gains do not indicate failure, but instead reflect cautious tactics aimed at minimizing casualties.
• He notes that capturing cities and towns is inherently time-consuming, producing gradual progress.
• Still, he maintains Russia is steadily worsening Ukraine’s ability to stay in the fight.

Air campaign analysis: punishment vs. strategic/operational effects

Mearsheimer distinguishes two broad ways air power can be used:

1. Punishment Hurting civilians/economy to force political pressure for surrender.

2. Operational/strategic disruption Targeting military infrastructure and supply/transport to reduce the ability to wage war.

He argues:

• Punishment strategies don’t work:
  • He cites Russia’s earlier campaign as failing to make Ukraine quit.
  • He also argues Ukraine’s drone “punishment” of Russia won’t make Russia stop.
• Russia has shifted toward the second approach, aiming to cripple Ukraine’s ability to fight by:
  • Shutting down Black Sea ports (e.g., Odessa and others), effectively making Ukraine landlocked and harming exports/imports and logistics.
  • Attacking transport networks (rail, roads, and fuel-related infrastructure) to limit movement of materiel to the front.
  • Disrupting energy infrastructure (he claims ~80% is already damaged, with further destruction intended).

Outside support for Ukraine (declining prospects)

He argues Ukraine could not sustain the war without Western support, but that support—especially U.S. support—has declined. He claims:

• The U.S. wants to shift burdens to Europeans.
• The U.S. faces munition shortfalls (specifically mentioning Patriot missiles), implying Ukraine lacks strong defenses against Russia’s large missile/drone barrage.
• A planned reassessment of U.S. troop levels in Europe could mean further reductions.

He also claims European politics may threaten continued aid:

• Poland–Ukraine relations have worsened.
• Right-wing electoral outcomes in France and Germany could reduce NATO/Ukraine commitments.

Internal politics in Ukraine

He argues Ukraine is experiencing war weariness, citing polls such as:

• 66% want negotiations
• 24% want to continue

He also claims President Zelensky is losing popularity compared with other figures (including Budanov, Fedorov, and General Zaluzhnyi) and treats Zelensky’s dismissal of Defense Minister Fedorov and General Syrskyi as evidence of serious trouble amid the war.

Where the war is “today” and what happens next (fatalist conclusion)

• He says Russia has annexed four oblasts plus Crimea and controls a very large share of that territory (estimating that Ukraine would have lost ~20% even if the war ended now).
• He argues Ukraine cannot realistically reverse these losses:
  • NATO membership is unlikely (he claims NATO is damaged and Europe would not reach consensus).
  • Ukraine is too destroyed and demographically affected, estimating about $600 billion to repair infrastructure, plus ongoing demographic losses.
• Bottom-line prediction: even if there is a ceasefire, Ukraine would only be freezing a disastrous outcome while Russia continues to pressure Ukraine over time.
• He concludes that mainstream reporting is inverted: Russia is doing well and Ukraine is doing poorly, and Ukraine is effectively doomed unless circumstances fundamentally change.

Presenters / contributors

• John Mearsheimer — presenter/author of the episode