ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТЬ ЗА ЧУЖИЕ ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЯ // Виктор Вахштайн в гостях у Михаила Светова

Summary

The discussion examines selective empathy, political solidarity, and responsibility for crimes committed by others.

• Empathy is selective. People tend to feel for those they see as close or similar, while charity can involve deliberately helping people very different from oneself. The speakers distinguish this personal emotional choice from the claim that a particular response should become a universal moral or political rule. They question the inconsistency of expressing compassion for one group while denying it to another—for example, sympathizing with Ukrainians harmed by the war while treating Russian mobilized people as undeserving of empathy.

• Empathy can become politically coercive. The speakers argue that public demands to empathize with one group may be coupled with hostility toward another. In that case, recognizing one group’s humanity can appear to require denying another’s. They warn against turning selective personal sympathies into a supposedly universal standard.

• Personal bonds differ from collective identity. Drawing on Aristotelian terms, Vakhshtain contrasts chosen relationships and friendships with forms of belonging rooted in shared fate, history, or community. Political solidarity can arise without personal affection—sometimes through a common enemy—and can override individual loyalties. Unlike an individual friendship, such political bonds are difficult to reverse through a simple act of forgiveness.

• Moral agency involves both identification and distance from oneself. The discussion considers whether a person can identify with someone very unlike them, or step back from their own role and refuse to act as expected. The speakers connect this capacity to moral resistance and to the “red lines” people may reach when they feel they could no longer live with themselves if they complied.

• Responsibility is not the same as guilt. Guilt is linked to an individual’s actions and intent; responsibility may arise from social ties, office, command, or membership in a collective. A commander, for instance, may be held responsible for crimes by subordinates even if they did not personally commit them. The speakers debate whether responsibility can be imposed on people because of their membership in a political community, and how that differs from individual criminal guilt.

• Political forgiveness and reparations depend on how a community is understood. The discussion uses postwar Germany and reparations to Israel to explore whether a later political entity can accept responsibility for the crimes of a predecessor while also claiming to be a different entity. The speakers distinguish reparations or compensation from punitive sanctions, and argue that accepting reparations can itself recognize a continuing political relationship.

• Collective responsibility is shaped by political power and agreement. The example of Iceland’s referendum-era refusal to repay certain foreign depositors is used to discuss whether collective decisions can make a society responsible for financial obligations. The conversation ends with the issue unresolved: responsibility may be grounded in social connection and collective identity, but its practical application also depends on political and legal power.

Presenters and Contributors

• Mikhail Svetov — presenter and host
• Viktor Vakhshtain — sociologist and guest contributor