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Why Is the Middle East Choosing India Over Pakistan Right Now?

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Overview

The speaker argues that several recent India–Middle East cooperation moves reflect a broader shift in the region away from Pakistan and toward India. This shift, they claim, is driven by:

  • intelligence and financial controls (including hawala disruption),
  • energy and strategic deals (oil purchases, refinery stakes, revenue bargains),
  • diplomatic timing during regional crises.

1) Arrest in India as a sign of increased security cooperation

  • The video claims a man linked to past anti-India hostility (referencing comments mocking a Pahalgam attack on Facebook) was arrested immediately upon arrival in India after living in Saudi Arabia.
  • The speaker presents this as proof that India’s foreign-policy and security approach has changed—framing it as: “India before today is not the India of today.”
  • The implication is better coordination with intelligence and foreign partners.

2) Historical claim: OIC dynamics were influenced by Pakistan

  • The speaker recounts a story from 1969 in which India is allegedly invited to a summit that later evolves into the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation).
  • They claim an Indian minister was humiliated when the gate was closed in his face.
  • The given explanation is “Pakistan pressure”:
    • Pakistan allegedly threatened that if India joined, Pakistan would not cooperate and would undermine the arrangement.
    • The speaker claims Middle East countries then conceded to Pakistan’s demands.
  • They further argue that Pakistan’s security capacity in the Middle East became a key source of influence (e.g., Pakistani commandos helping address extremists at the Grand Mosque in 1979).

3) Shift in 2015: the Middle East no longer “needs” Pakistan’s leverage

The speaker’s core thesis is that from the 1990–2014 period, and especially in 2015, Middle East countries reduced dependence on Pakistan because:

  • their own security/monitoring improved via technology (internet-based tracking and censorship),
  • they built independent infrastructure.

They argue that India then exploited the opening by reducing Pakistan’s influence through:

  • intelligence collaboration, and
  • aggressive diplomacy.

4) Alleged intelligence/financial strategy connected to Kashmir backlash

  • The video claims India used financial intelligence cooperation—specifically MoUs/links with Saudi Arabia’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)—to identify hawala flows funding unrest.
  • It links this to fears of escalation after post-2016 unrest, following Burhan Wani’s killing.
  • The speaker alleges India conducted a “brutal crackdown” on hawala networks once stone-pelting backlash began.
  • They claim a subsequent rapid drop in stone-pelting and related violence occurred because money channels were disrupted.

5) Energy and revenue bargain: India supports Saudi interests post-2015

Another major argument is that after the US became “energy independent” (tied by the speaker to falling oil prices), Saudi revenue dropped sharply. The speaker claims India offered Saudi Arabia:

  • regular annual oil purchases (framed as a $15–20 billion/year support deal),
  • a cooperative financial intelligence mechanism to track illicit finance (described as low-cost but high-value for India).

6) UAE food-security and investment deal (2018–2022 context)

  • The video references an “I2U2” summit and claims the UAE promised investment with strategic benefits:
    • the UAE invests roughly $2 billion into India’s food-processing/agricultural infrastructure to address food security.
  • The speaker argues this strengthens economic interdependence, making it harder to impose sanctions or enable anti-India actions.

7) Khashoggi episode as a “window” for India to win Saudi trust (2018–2019)

  • The speaker argues that after the Jamal Khashoggi killing controversy and related Western backlash, Saudi sought strategic partners.
  • They claim Saudi also needed capital for the NEOM project.
  • India is portrayed as positioning itself diplomatically during that period with a “special meeting,” then securing major energy-sector advantages.

8) Refinery stake deal to lock long-term ties and reduce vulnerability to sanctions

  • The speaker claims Saudi (Aramco) was offered a 50% stake in India’s Ratnagiri Refinery (around ₹44 billion value).
  • The implied logic:
    • Saudi can bring oil into India and generate stable cash flow.
  • The argument continues that once Saudi has large assets in India, it is less likely to support Pakistan-driven sanctions or anti-India pressure, because such actions would harm Saudi investments and related regional interests (including the UAE food-security arrangement).

9) Article 370 and OIC pressure allegedly fails due to reduced Middle East dependence on Pakistan

  • The video asserts that after India revoked Article 370 (2019), Pakistan tried to mobilize OIC-based sanctions pressure.
  • It claims Saudi/UAE either refused to back sanctions or “closed their eyes,” treating the change as India’s internal matter.
  • The speaker frames this as evidence that India now has more leverage and Pakistan’s influence is less effective.

Overall Conclusion

The speaker’s central claim is that India is displacing Pakistan in the Middle East through a combination of:

  • tighter intelligence/financial cooperation (disrupting hawala-linked funding),
  • energy and investment deals (oil purchases, refinery stakes),
  • diplomatic timing during regional crises,

leading Middle East governments to view India as a more reliable strategic partner than Pakistan.

Presenters or Contributors

  • No other presenter or contributor names are provided in the subtitles.
  • The account appears to be delivered by a single speaker.

Original video