Video summary

8 de junio de 2023. Sesión 3 del Módulo I

Main summary

Key takeaways

Educational

Main ideas, concepts, and lessons

1) Purpose and scope of the session (Part One)

  • The session introduces foundational concepts for constitutional and conventionality control in Mexico.
  • It focuses on the constitutional bloc and the control of conventionality is reserved mostly for the next session.
  • The speaker frames the need to understand how Mexico got to its current doctrine, especially regarding:
    • Article 133 of the Constitution (and its historical evolution),
    • the relationship between national (domestic) law and international law, and
    • how these developments support the modern parameter of constitutional regularity / constitutional bloc logic.

2) Key structural debate: international law vs. domestic law

The speaker explains that international law scholarship generally distinguishes two schools:

Dualism

  • International law and domestic constitutional/national law are separate and independent systems.
  • International law governs relations between states; domestic law governs relations between individuals and the state.
  • For an international treaty to be effective domestically, a legislative act is required to “nationalize” the treaty.
  • Example mentioned: United States—a person typically cannot claim direct domestic enforceability of international obligations without implementing legislation.
  • The Avena case is used to illustrate the argument that ICJ judgments/obligations do not automatically become domestic law without congressional action.

Monism

  • International law norms are immediately integrated into the domestic legal system once the state consents (e.g., signing/ratifying/accepting/accession).
  • Legislative incorporation is not required because the treaty becomes part of the domestic system automatically.
  • The speaker uses the monist model to explain why Mexico’s approach can differ from the U.S./other dualist systems, even if both face compliance debates.

Core lesson: comparisons like “if the U.S. doesn’t comply, Mexico shouldn’t” do not necessarily hold because their legal reception models can differ (monist vs. dualist).

3) Article 133: not originally about “normative hierarchy” as such

  • The speaker argues that Article 133 historically did not originate to establish a strong normative hierarchy between the Constitution and treaties.
  • Its influence is traced to the U.S. Constitution (notably the “supreme law of the land” clause).
  • In the original Mexican/constituent context, it was treated more as:
    • ensuring federal constitutional supremacy regarding government structure and compliance by federative entities,
    • rather than resolving “which norm prevails” through a strict hierarchical ladder.

4) Major historical modifications to Article 133 (especially 1933)

A significant turning point described is:

1933 reform

  • Added language (paraphrased by the speaker): only treaties “in accordance with the Constitution” are supreme law.
  • Purpose (as presented):
    • to protect Mexico against constitutional fraud, and
    • to ensure that certain international treaty effects would not undermine national constitutional goals (with the nationality reform context described as central).
  • This reframed the debate into compatibility/accordance with the Constitution, setting an early logic that later jurists interpreted as hierarchy.

5) Judicial evolution: from compatibility/legality distinctions to “hierarchy” consolidation

The speaker describes how Supreme Court interpretation evolved through nationalist contexts and specific disputes:

  • Mid-20th century interpretation shift

    • Example: 1976 patent/inventions context
    • The Court reasoned that challenges based on “incompatibility between domestic law and international treaties” were treated as a matter of legality, not constitutionality.
    • Consequence: international treaties were placed below the Constitution in practical adjudication.

  • 1990s–early 2000s consolidation

    • The speaker claims a precedent trajectory made the hierarchy interpretation feel “consolidated,” even if earlier origins existed elsewhere.
    • Example: a case cited as 2069, where the Court held:
      • laws of Congress and international treaties do not share the same normative rank as the Constitution,
      • both are subordinate to the Constitution because:
        • laws derive from the Constitution, and
        • treaties must be in accordance with the Constitution.

  • Further refinements in later cases

    • Example referenced: air traffic controllers labor/union case (amparo en revisión 1475),
      • described as involving a multi-level hierarchy approach (Constitution above treaties above federal laws),
      • with the speaker also critiquing aspects of the argument.

  • 2007 reconfiguration

    • Example: amparo en revisión 120/2002 involving tariffs and a free trade agreement.
    • The Court’s hierarchical mapping (as explained):
      • Constitution first,
      • below it: international treaties,
      • below: general laws,
      • and bottom: federal laws.
    • The speaker uses this to illustrate why litigating based on human rights treaties was difficult earlier: rights enforcement was constrained by constitutional supremacy and hierarchy logic.

  • Strategic litigation attempt before 2011

    • Example: amparo indirecto 1157/2007 (referred to as “Minuma”)
    • An indigenous community in Guerrero challenges omissions/failure affecting health service access.
    • Argument: international obligations under the ICESCR require accessibility/availability/quality/adaptability of the right to health.
    • Key described point:
      • the district judge effectively sidestepped complex hierarchy doctrine and emphasized effective binding force of the treaty because Mexico ratified it.

6) “Constitutional bloc” and opening clauses: what changes after the 2011 human rights reform

The speaker frames the transition to the constitutional bloc / parameter of constitutional regularity.

a) What “constitutional bloc” means (conceptual definition)

  • A constitution may include norms with constitutional relevance not written directly in the constitutional text.
  • In Mexico, the key expansion comes via:
    • the reform to Article 1, and
    • the interpretation that human rights norms in international treaties are part of the Constitution.

b) Opening clauses

  • An opening clause is a constitutional provision that “opens” the system to incorporate other norms from other normative orders (notably international law).
  • The speaker argues:
    • Article 133 was traditionally treated as the main opening clause,
    • but after Article 1, Article 1 becomes an additional opening clause for human rights integration.

c) “Constitution in strict sense” vs “constitution in broad sense”

  • Dual-circle idea:
    • strict sense: written constitutional articles,
    • broad sense: human rights norms found in international treaties.
  • Mexico’s distinctive feature (as described):
    • the bloc is integrated by human rights norms within international treaties, not by all international treaty norms indiscriminately.

d) Example: consular notification/assistance as a “human rights” norm despite not being in a human rights treaty

  • Even norms from non–human rights treaties (e.g., consular relations conventions) can be treated as human rights norms under the Article 1 logic.
  • References mentioned:
    • Franz Escassa and
    • an Inter-American Court advisory opinion.
  • The speaker also uses a Miranda rights / consular notification type of reasoning to show that the bloc can include rights-like protections beyond typical treaty categories.

7) Supreme Court use of “constitutional bloc” is limited; it appears in selective contexts

The speaker claims the term is not widely adopted in Mexican doctrine, but the Court has used related ideas.

Two main Court references described:

  • Controversy 31/2006

    • electoral tribunal and budget autonomy within the Federal District.
    • The Court described a constitutional bloc “between”:
      • the Constitution and
      • the Federal District’s statute,
    • specifically in electoral matters (as presented).

  • Unconstitutionality action 47/2006 (attributed in the summary to Minister Margarita Beatriz Luna Ramos)

    • Court rejected extending the “constitutional bloc” beyond that electoral context.
    • It emphasized that changing constitutional content must follow Article 135 procedures, not “bloc” reasoning.

  • Later development via a “parameter” approach

    • Example referenced: a Yucatán addictions prevention case resolved by Minister Olga Sánchez Cordero.
    • The Court (as presented) used the parameter of constitutional regularity:
      • when an international norm is more protective than the Constitution,
      • international protection prevails as the more protective standard.

8) Parameter of constitutional regularity (Mexican “version” of bloc logic)

The speaker describes Contradiction of theses 293 and explains the “parameter” as the key tool:

  • Core function

    • create a structured “playing field” combining:
      • constitutional rights (written or constitutionalized), and
      • human rights norms from international treaties.
    • This supports judges in interpretation in conformity with the Constitution.

  • Shift from classical hierarchy

    • Contradiction 293 is portrayed as rejecting the old hierarchical view:
      • Constitution is above and treaty-based human rights are below.
    • Instead, human rights norms become constitutional norms through Article 1.
    • Their validity depends on content/materiality, not a formal rank ladder.

9) Contradiction of theses 293: main stated outcomes

The speaker highlights the doctrinal takeaway:

  • Human rights norms are not hierarchical in the old sense.
  • Human rights norms included through Article 1 are constitutional norms, integrated into the Constitution.
  • Therefore:
    • you can’t treat certain human rights treaty norms as lower-value merely because they are not “in the constitutional text.”
  • Example used: a right to life argument—even if not present as a single constitutional article, it is protected through international human rights instruments and must be treated as constitutional in content.

10) Conventionality control and inter-American jurisprudence (binding effect)

The speaker previews the link to the next session:

  • Conventionality control requires judges to consider Inter-American standards.
  • The emphasis is on the binding nature of Inter-American Court jurisprudence (as framed by the Court in 293):
    • it binds all judicial authorities in Mexico,
    • even if Mexico was not a party to the specific international case.
  • This opens debates about boundaries of the bloc/parameter, addressed through other interpretive tools (including interpretation in conformity with the Constitution).

Methodology / instruction-like elements (as presented)

No formal step-by-step methodology is provided, but the speaker repeatedly describes practical interpretive mechanics. Closest implied procedural guidance includes:

  • Approach after the new model

    • Identify and systematize relevant constitutional norms and human rights norms integrated through Article 1 (including those from international treaties).
    • Use the parameter of constitutional regularity as the interpretive “playing field.”
    • Perform interpretation in conformity with the Constitution, recognizing that:
      • human rights norms from international treaties are constitutional norms (not inferior by rank).
    • When comparing standards, give effect to the most protective human rights interpretation (as illustrated in the Yucatán framing).

  • When treaties conflict with constitutional text

    • Options referenced:
      • constitutional reform (invoking Article 135),
      • denunciation of the treaty (with defined timelines),
      • interpretative declarations/reservations at signature/ratification time.
    • Courts still determine the scope of unconstitutionality and treaty effects, and interpretative declarations/reservations can be challenged internationally.

  • Conventionality control (preview)

    • Treat Inter-American conventional standards as binding reference for judges.
    • Analyze domestic adjudication in light of those conventional norms.

Speakers / sources featured (named)

Speakers

  • Rosa María Macías Macías — Moderator; Head of the House of Legal Culture in La Paz (and representative of the organizing institutions).
  • Dr. Daniel Antonio García Huerta (also transcribed as “García Huerto/Huerto”) — Speaker; Deputy Director General for the Promotion and Guarantee of Human Rights, General Unit of Scientific Knowledge and Human Rights.

Institutions, courts, and bodies cited or relied upon

  • General Unit of Scientific Knowledge and Human Rights (Mexico)
  • General Directorate of Houses of Legal Culture (Mexico)
  • Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) (Mexico)
  • Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
  • Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
  • International Labour Organization (ILO) (Convention 87 mentioned)
  • International Court of Justice (ICJ)
  • District courts / collegiate courts (Mexican judicial levels referenced)

Legal instruments / documents cited

  • Mexican Constitution
    • Article 1
    • Article 133
    • Article 135
  • International human rights instruments
    • Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (clarified not a treaty)
    • American Convention on Human Rights
    • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
    • Convention on the Protection of Consular Relations
    • ILO Convention 87
  • Other references
    • Paris Convention (patents/inventions/trademarks context)
    • NAFTA (tariffs case context)
    • Schism/crisis of positivism referenced conceptually (post-WWII Germany context)

Specific cases / proceedings mentioned

  • Avena
  • Franz Escassa
  • Rosendo Radilla
  • Contradiction of theses 293
  • Contradiction of theses 912 (mentioned as upcoming)
  • Amparo indirecto 1157/2007 (“Minuma”)
  • Amparo en revisión 120/2002
  • Amparo en revisión 1475
  • Controversy 31/2006
  • Unconstitutionality action 47/2006
  • Yucatán addictions prevention case (forced labor sanctions referenced)
  • Olmedo Bustos v. Chile and Last Temptation of Christ
  • Radilla Pacheco (reservation invalidation mention)

Expert/authors referenced (indirectly)

  • Samuel (name not completed in subtitles) — author of The Last Utopia
  • Other doctrine voices referenced generically (e.g., “Minister Salinas” for dialogue logic; not fully identified beyond that)

Questions asked by participants (high-level topics, not answered in full detail)

  • Whether monist systems/dualism are “defined from their constitution.”
  • Main disadvantages of the monist system.
  • Purpose of the existence of an international human rights law regime.
  • Practical conflict-resolution when a treaty conflicts with the Constitution, including:
    • constitutional reform,
    • denunciation,
    • reservations/interpretative declarations,
    • and challenges of litigation and implementation.

Original video