John Mearsheimer: Trump Has No Military Option Against Iran

Summary

John Mearsheimer argues that the United States has limited ability to achieve its aims through military force in Iran, Yemen, and Ukraine, and that the Trump administration is aware of those constraints. In his view, Trump has generally sought to reduce U.S. commitments and negotiate, but launching a war against Iran was a major—and potentially presidency-ending—mistake.

Iran and the threat of renewed strikes

Mearsheimer doubts that Trump will attack Iran, despite threats and reported movements of U.S. forces and naval assets. He says a proposed three-day bombing campaign would be unlikely to force Iran to surrender, especially since a much longer bombing campaign had already failed to achieve that outcome. He argues that the administration has not explained a credible path from attacks to victory.

Coercion versus war

Mearsheimer distinguishes between threatening force to pressure an adversary and actually using force to achieve a goal. He sees Trump’s threats and military deployments as an attempt to coerce Iran, but believes that approach is unlikely to work. The central question, he says, is whether Trump will resort to war if coercion fails.

Retaliation and escalation risks

Mearsheimer warns that a severe U.S. attack could provoke Iran to strike U.S. allies and critical infrastructure across the Gulf. He cites Iranian threats against targets including Israel’s Dimona facility, undersea internet cables, Gulf data centers, desalination plants, and energy infrastructure.

His point is that the greater the damage the United States inflicts, the stronger Iran’s incentive to retaliate—and the more difficult it becomes to contain the conflict.

U.S. military position in the Gulf

Mearsheimer claims that U.S. bases in the region have been severely damaged or destroyed, making it difficult to recreate the conditions for earlier operations. He argues that repeating a campaign that failed before, with weaker regional military infrastructure, would have little prospect of success.

Domestic politics and the midterms

Mearsheimer argues that delaying an attack until after the U.S. midterm elections would not solve the strategic problem: the consequences of an attack would be serious either before or after the vote. He also says the war is unpopular and that prolonging it could worsen its political costs, particularly amid economic concerns.

Glenn Diesen suggests the delay may also reflect the war’s low chance of success and a desire to project strength.

Saudi Arabia and the Houthis

Mearsheimer says Trump encouraged Saudi Arabia to confront the Houthis but declined to help when the Saudis requested assistance. He interprets the refusal as recognition of U.S. military limits, recalling the earlier U.S. campaign against the Houthis, which he says failed to defeat them.

He cites reports of Houthi attacks on Saudi airports and oil infrastructure, including the East-West pipeline, Yanbu, and Ras Tanura, while noting uncertainty about some reports.

Ukraine

Mearsheimer says Trump has shifted much of the burden of supporting Ukraine to Europe and wants Europeans to pay for weapons. He argues that Trump recognizes the United States lacks a strategy for winning the war and is seeking a deal, but faces obstacles from Ukraine’s leadership, European governments, and U.S. officials and lawmakers he describes as hawkish. He adds that the CIA remains deeply involved, limiting Trump’s ability to change course.

Risks of conflicts merging

Diesen raises the possibility that a U.S. attack on Iran could involve Saudi territory or airspace and draw Saudi Arabia into the conflict. Mearsheimer says Saudi Arabia would likely try to prevent its airspace from being used.

He also warns that Iran might direct retaliation toward Israel or other Gulf states while the Houthis continue fighting Saudi Arabia, broadening the conflict.

Wider alignment

Mearsheimer suggests that Russia, China, and North Korea have incentives to support Iran against the United States. He says Russia may also be assisting the Houthis with intelligence, though he cautions that press reports on this are unconfirmed. He argues that the Houthis are already imposing costs on Saudi Arabia without needing Iranian help.

Presenters and contributors

• Glenn Diesen — Presenter and interviewer
• John Mearsheimer — Guest and commentator