How Iran Just Won the Iraq War

Overview

The speaker argues that the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq ends a long campaign that was primarily framed as fighting ISIS. They contend, however, that Iran is the real strategic winner of the post-withdrawal outcome.

In this view, Iran’s overarching, decades-long objective is to build a land “bridge” running from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, allowing Iran to transfer missiles, drones, and weapons directly to its regional proxy networks—most notably Hezbollah, and also other groups operating in places such as Yemen. The speaker claims that defeating ISIS was only part of the story, with Iran allegedly using Iraq’s internal armed dynamics to position itself for long-term influence.

Key Points: Iran’s Leverage in Iraq

• U.S. role as counterweight (as claimed by the speaker): The speaker argues that U.S. presence in Iraq was partly intended to counter Iranian influence and prevent the transfer of weapons from Iraq to proxy forces.

• Escalating attacks on U.S. interests (last two years, as cited): The speaker points to a range of actions, including:

  • drone strikes on bases
  • shootdowns of Black Hawk helicopters
  • destruction of radar stations
  • an attack on the embassy
  • missile strikes

• Attribution beyond Iran: They argue these actions come not only from Iran directly, but also from Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militias, which they describe as:

  • funded, supported, and trained by Iran
  • largely connected to Iran-affiliated networks

Iraq’s Armed Landscape (as Presented)

The speaker describes Iraq’s security environment as three overlapping elements:

• the Iraqi army
• the Kurdish Peshmerga/KRG
• the PMF

They emphasize that the PMF is the largest armed bloc and is politically and religiously aligned with Iran.

The speaker also includes personal testimony, claiming they were:

• detained at checkpoints, and
• moved through areas controlled by Iran-aligned forces, which they present as evidence of real-world control on the ground.

Kurdish Dynamics and Turkey’s Role

• “Sovereignty” shift and Kurdish disarmament (as framed by the speaker): The speaker claims Iraq’s transition included Kurdish disarmament and the closure/withdrawal of Turkish bases related to countering Kurdish opposition forces.

• Turkey’s motivation (as claimed): They argue Turkey’s central security concern was Kurdish armed opposition groups, and that Turkey stayed in Iraq until Iraqi authorities effectively pressured or managed the Kurdish issue.

• Current transition and Turkey-linked Kurdish groups: The speaker claims current developments are affecting Kurdish groups associated with Turkish-origin fighters, with these groups being removed or reintegrated under Turkish terms.

Iran vs. the Kurdish Autonomous Region (Erbil)

• Claim of sustained bombardment: The speaker alleges Iran has bombed Erbil nearly daily for two years.

• Role of U.S. air defense (as claimed): They argue U.S. forces previously provided critical air defense (including Patriot and MANPADS). Without U.S. support, they say the Kurdish region faces a difficult choice:

  • resist Iran militarily (which they claim they cannot do effectively due to lack of modern air defenses), or
  • reach an accommodation acknowledging Iran’s interests.

• Terms of accommodation (as described): The speaker claims the accommodation likely involves:

  • no harboring of Iranian Kurdish militants, and
  • limits on cross-border raids.

• Impact on Kurdish disarmament and politics: They argue Kurdish disarmament and political realignment are being driven by this pressure.

Shengal (“YBS”) and the “Tunnels” Strategy

The speaker narrows focus to YBS (the group they associate with), describing it as:

• small in manpower, but
• strategically entrenched in the Sinjar/Shengal area.

They claim YBS agreed to:

• remove Turkish-origin Kurdish fighters, and
• potentially integrate into Iraq’s PMF or a PMF-related brigade.

Warning about integration and “tunnels”

The speaker warns that integration will likely allow Iran-backed PMF forces to take over YBS infrastructure—especially “tunnels”—to:

• store ballistic missiles and drones, and
• expand Iran-aligned operational capability in a protected geographic area.

In their framing, this could reduce the effectiveness of U.S. strikes, with the claim that “B-2s cannot bomb these tunnels.”

Overall Conclusion and Criticism of U.S. “Long-Game” Neglect

The speaker praises U.S. efforts against ISIS at the time—especially ending the “caliphate”—but argues the U.S. failed to sustain a long-term strategy after ISIS’s defeat.

They claim the outcome has produced further Iranian gains, including alleged losses by the U.S. and partners across the broader region:

• reduced influence in Syria
• reduced influence in Yemen
• loss or erosion of leverage related to the Strait of Hormuz
• “almost completely losing” Iraq (as stated by the speaker)

They compare the situation to Afghanistan, arguing that quitting wars “not our business” may be tactically understandable, but that the U.S. allegedly neglected:

• warning signs, and
• political realities—especially regarding Kurdish decision-making and Iran’s long-term planning.

They conclude that YBS will likely continue to exist, but under much greater Iran-aligned pressure and control.

Presenters / Contributors

No named presenters are clearly identifiable from the subtitles.