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ПУТИНА НАЧАЛИ ХОРОНИТЬ ЗАЖИВО. Сливают чужие и свои

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Overview

The video argues that Vladimir Putin’s fall (or the regime’s collapse) is not sudden, but the result of a long-running, multi-group loss of belief and confidence happening at the same time across:

  • elites
  • financial actors
  • foreign patrons
  • ordinary people

Recent developments are framed as “harbingers”—like birds flying low before rain: not the immediate cause, but evidence the system is already changing.

1) Elite fear and capital flight (via Bloomberg)

A central claim is that Russian elites are increasingly driven by fear of confiscation and distrust in the banking/state system.

Key points (citing Bloomberg and related coverage):

  • An investigation claims Russian billionaires (including people close to Putin) funneled tens of billions of dollars out of Russia in 2025, with outflows accelerating recently.
  • Destinations and methods mentioned include:
    • cryptocurrency
    • gold
    • real estate (Dubai)
    • Turkey
    • Monaco
    • Gulf private funds
    • routes routed through Armenia / Kazakhstan / Kyrgyzstan, linked to A7A5 Stable Coin (associated with Ilan Shor and Promsvyazbank infrastructure).
  • The presenter argues the confiscation cycle is intensifying, citing Prosecutor-General reporting that the state “returned” assets worth over 4 trillion rubles (about $50B).
  • A March meeting is described where business leaders were allegedly pushed toward “donations,” interpreted by elites as a signal that their assets and timing are vulnerable.
  • Bank risk is also emphasized:
    • warnings about worse-than-admitted bad debt
    • concerns about a systemic banking crisis

2) China as a “junior partner” and a hedge against Putin

The video claims the West is treated as the enemy, but argues the deeper shift is Russia’s relationship with China.

It cites a Wall Street Journal report portraying China’s approach as:

  • “marinating Russia” by buying discounted resources
  • pushing terms that subordinate Moscow (e.g., Russian gas prices far below market)

Additional claims include:

  • The “Power of Siberia” pipeline deal is portrayed as unlikely to benefit Russia meaningfully under Chinese leverage (with Beijing demanding subsidization; the pipeline reportedly not finalized after Putin’s Beijing trip).
  • China is described as not just helping Moscow, but preparing for what comes after Putin, including:
    • building networks with Russian officials and future elites “bypassing Putin”
    • maintaining financial/infrastructure ties that enable sanctions circumvention while avoiding direct pressure on Moscow
  • China is also said to be increasing influence in regional institutions (e.g., pushing the yuan and a banking framework tied to former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan).
  • The presenter highlights humiliation/control cues in diplomacy (route/tour staging and media symbolism) and rejects official claims of “equality” between partners.

3) Synchronized declines in public opinion as warning signs

The video argues that Kremlin-controlled (or Kremlin-linked) polling shows a measurable downturn.

Examples cited:

  • FOM:
    • Putin’s positive assessment reportedly fell from 71% to 66% in one week
    • negative assessments reportedly reached a war-era high (the video states up to 16% for negatives; distrust around 20%)
  • Other state polling bodies (TsOM, VTsIOM) are described as showing:
    • falling trust in Putin (down from mid-June peaks)
    • deterioration in national situation assessments
    • weakening satisfaction with the government

The presenter interprets the pattern as:

  • broad, simultaneous movement among top officials
  • people being more cautious in open survey answers, while trends remain consistent

4) Everyday impacts: fuel crisis as evidence the war is reaching home

A large portion focuses on fuel shortages and claims they reflect logistical breakdown driven by Ukrainian strikes.

Reported symptoms in Russia and Crimea (occupied)

  • Crimea: retail gasoline rationed (limited liters per person, queues at night, black-market resales at far higher prices).
  • Across more than 70 regions:
    • limits and restrictions (caps on liters)
    • bans on canister sales
    • odd/even day purchase schedules

The presenter argues:

  • queues may become less visible in some places,
  • but the shortage and instability persist.

Russia’s response described as desperate

  • fuel export bans
  • large-scale imports, including from Belarus and India
  • permission to produce Euro-3 gasoline (described as having much higher sulfur content than current standards)

Link to Ukrainian attacks on refineries

The video ties the crisis to strikes on oil refineries, citing:

  • Bloomberg/OPEC-style corroboration
  • claims that at least 24 of 30 major refineries were impacted
  • the view that attacks are near-daily and geographically persistent, including deep into Russia (e.g., drone reach to Omsk)

5) Recruiting problems and “unmanned systems” training shortfalls

The presenter argues the recruitment and “military machine” narrative is weakening.

Claims include:

  • Recruitment/pay contract statistics are used to suggest fewer people signing than before, despite high payments.
  • A “last resort” theory (that recruitment keeps the front filled) is said to be failing:
    • recruitment office output allegedly cannot keep pace with frontline attrition.
  • Unmanned systems training is presented as propaganda vs reality:
    • the Defense Ministry reportedly claims progress (e.g., 8,000 specialists trained)
    • analysis by the Conflict Intelligence Team argues training totals are far below planned schedules
    • students are allegedly refusing to sign contracts due to fear of indefinite transfer/assault duty

6) Overarching thesis: regime stability is unravelling simultaneously

The conclusion frames the situation as structural—reinforcing multiple failure points at once:

  • elites are moving capital and reducing exposure
  • China is hedging and preparing for post-Putin governance leverage
  • public support and trust are eroding
  • the state’s ability to implement war priorities (fuel supply, recruitment, training) is declining

The presenter stresses:

  • no single element proves collapse by itself
  • but the combination resembles pre-collapse patterns seen historically, including a comparison to autumn 1922 dynamics after mobilization

The video argues that:

  • repression and TV messaging won’t restore belief
  • such actions could worsen capital flight
  • the regime may “stop functioning” before any mass overthrow, because participants are already mentally planning for a future without Putin.

Presenters or contributors

  • Vladimir Milov (named/quoted as an analyst)
  • Gabuev (Carnegie Center director; first name not given in subtitles)
  • Ilhan Shor (named as associated with the stablecoin/payment company; described as a fugitive Moldovan banker)
  • Michael Nucky (the video’s narrator/presenter; appears at the end)

Original video