Why Europe is getting safer, despite migration | prof. Paolo Pinotti

Summary

Immigrants and crime statistics

Professor Paolo Pinotti argues that immigrant overrepresentation in arrest and prison statistics is not, by itself, proof that immigrants commit more crime. Crime statistics capture only reported offences, and migrants may be more likely than natives to be arrested or jailed before trial—for example, because authorities consider them more likely to leave the country. Still, Pinotti thinks the size of the disparity in some countries suggests that differences in offending are part of the explanation.

He emphasizes that this does not mean immigrant status itself causes crime. Immigrant populations tend to include more young, single men, who are more likely to offend across populations. In addition, people without residence or work permits may be unable to take legal jobs, making crime a more likely source of income. In an Italian snapshot from about a decade ago, Pinotti says, 95% of foreign prisoners lacked legal status; he estimates that legal immigrants had roughly the same probability of offending as natives.

Differences between countries

The US comparison is complicated, Pinotti says, by differences in who migrates and the opportunities available to them. The US attracts many highly educated migrants, and undocumented workers were historically sometimes able to work using false Social Security numbers, giving them a legal-sector alternative to crime.

Pinotti also notes that the perceived threat of deportation may deter some people, while exclusion and a sense of having “nothing to lose” could increase risk-taking among others.

Crime trends and comparisons

Pinotti cautions that many offences—especially theft and burglary—are underreported, making comparisons between countries unreliable. Homicide is a more comparable measure. He says homicide rates have fallen in many countries; in Italy, they dropped by about 80% since the 1990s, from roughly 2.5 to 0.5 per 100,000 people. Italy’s homicide rate is also lower than those of Germany and some Scandinavian countries, despite common perceptions that Italy is especially dangerous.

Regarding Sweden, Pinotti acknowledges concerns about segregation and weapons trafficking in some communities, but says the homicide rate has been broadly stable in recent years rather than showing the dramatic rise suggested by some media coverage.

Estimating immigration’s effect on crime

To estimate immigration’s causal effect on crime, Pinotti favors comparing areas within the same country that receive different migrant inflows, using external events—such as conflict or economic crises in migrants’ countries of origin—as sources of variation. He says studies using this approach in countries including Italy, Germany, and the US generally find no statistically significant effect of immigration on overall violent or property crime.

He offers several possible explanations for why this can coexist with immigrant overrepresentation in crime statistics. Immigrants are a relatively small share of the population, so even higher offending rates may have limited effects on aggregate crime. There may also be substitution: immigrants may enter some criminal activities while natives leave them or move into different roles.

Preliminary work with Olivier Marie using data on criminal networks, Pinotti says, finds that immigration inflows are associated with more crimes committed by immigrants and with some natives exiting crime, including by seeking legal work or welfare. He presents this as suggestive, not conclusive.

Public perceptions

Pinotti argues that public perceptions are shaped by salience: people notice groups and incidents that seem unusual, and media outlets, algorithms, and political campaigns may amplify crimes involving immigrants. This can lead people to overestimate both the immigrant share of the population and immigrants’ role in crime.

Policy and legal work opportunities

Pinotti highlights research suggesting that access to legal status and work permits can reduce offending. He cites studies in which the probability of committing crimes fell by about half after immigrants gained legal status or a work permit. He also describes evidence that employment restrictions on asylum seekers may contribute to local crime increases, unlike the patterns found for economic migrants who can work.

He is skeptical of dispersal policies when they place asylum seekers in areas with few job opportunities and limited prospects for integration.

Pinotti recognizes that expanding legal work opportunities might create incentives for some migration, but argues that many people migrate because of circumstances—such as conflict—that are largely independent of destination-country policy. Leaving people without status, he warns, can create a large, vulnerable population excluded from legal employment. As one alternative, he proposes allocating permits according to labor-market needs and applicants’ relevant skills.

The host cautions that employers’ claims of labor shortages can sometimes mask poor wages or conditions, and that migrant labor may weaken workers’ bargaining power. Pinotti agrees that competition can put pressure on native workers, while arguing that some skilled trades are well paid because supply is scarce.

Presenters and contributors

• Alejandro Iribas de la Puerta — Host
• Professor Paolo Pinotti — Guest