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Webinar dla poszkodowanych klientów Zondacrypto 26.04.2026 prowadzący mec. Robert Nogacki

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News and Commentary

Overview

mec. Robert Nogacki hosted a webinar for people affected by the Zondacrypto crisis (April 26, 2026).

He frames the situation as a large-scale, long-running failure involving possible breaches of Polish and EU crypto/financial rules. He emphasizes that victims should focus on actions that preserve evidence and claims, rather than on speculative or low-probability strategies.

1) Why accounts were disabled / “wallet” issue

  • Nogacki explains that customers’ crypto balances appeared to be draining toward zero around March–April, which he says is typical of exchanges attempting to obscure where assets are held.
  • He highlights “address contamination” logic: screening systems may flag addresses after even small transfers from suspicious sources, and exchanges sometimes use this as justification for asset-handling patterns.
  • His core allegation: the company allegedly had a supposed reserve of about 4,500 bitcoins, but customers cannot access it. He describes it as an “open wallet address without access,” with responsibility shifted among individuals (including references to missing persons).

2) What happened politically/managerially (as presented)

Nogacki argues the crisis likely escalated through multiple red flags:

  • He references regulatory violations (e.g., loans within a capital group despite restrictions) and claims these contradict marketing stating the firm “simply stores customers’ crypto.”
  • He says public statements by leadership became inconsistent: one leader is portrayed as announcing large holdings while also implying customers’ access is impossible.
  • After leadership reportedly disappeared and the company “lights went out,” he treats the end of the story as effectively moving toward insolvency.

3) Key expectations: recovery is statistically unlikely

A major portion of the webinar is devoted to probabilities:

  • Nogacki cites global statistics on crypto fraud/bankruptcy recoveries: typically 3–7% of funds are recovered, often over several years.
  • He states the probability of recovery is below 10%, advising victims to prepare psychologically and financially for disappointment.
  • He mentions rare “best case” examples (e.g., older exchange bankruptcies where assets were later found) but stresses these are exceptional and not reliable to base plans on.

4) Two competing scenarios about the alleged 4,500 BTC

Nogacki says it is not yet fully known whether the “4,500 BTC wallet” contains assets, but he outlines two possibilities:

  1. Assets hidden somewhere and later lost to access

    • If keys/assets can be located, recovery might be possible.

  2. A “classic pyramid/fiction” model

    • Worse for victims: balances were shown as if backed by real BTC, but the exchange allegedly relied on new customer deposits and withdrawals.
    • He suggests a crucial clue would be whether the wallet was inactive since ~2016; if so, he argues access was already gone—meaning customers were kept in the fiction while they continued paying.

5) Why civil lawsuits are (likely) inefficient; focus shifts to bankruptcy and criminal case

Nogacki discusses procedure:

  • He says civil claims and “first come, first served” asset protection are unlikely to help because:
    • civil actions will likely be suspended once bankruptcy is declared
    • victims would still need to pay fees and invest effort with poor prospects
  • He explains the logic of bankruptcy:
    • bankruptcy administrators take control
    • claims are grouped into categories; priority depends on class, not “who filed first” within the same class

6) Most promising path: criminal proceedings + victim status

He strongly emphasizes registering as an aggrieved party (wronged party) in criminal proceedings:

  • He says it is not about instant money—criminal proceedings can take years—but it is the most “cost-free for the victim” route compared with civil cases.
  • He argues that victims’ biggest near-term value is asset securing and evidence preservation, not endless administrative complaints.
  • He warns that victims filing massive uncoordinated reports won’t speed outcomes because the case requires centralization and long confirmation steps.

7) Possible state liability (very cautious)

He briefly addresses claims against the State Treasury:

  • He says such claims require proving a specific legal obligation by a specific authority and showing how it failed—not just broad “they should have acted” arguments.
  • He suggests these claims are premature until criminal findings provide supporting evidence.

8) Bankruptcy venue: Poland vs Estonia; request for Poland jurisdiction

He discusses where the bankruptcy might be conducted:

  • He suggests it could be in Estonia (and/or with a branch in Poland).
  • If feasible, he argues it would be better if proceedings were handled in Poland for predictability, cost monitoring, and access to files.
  • He cites the potential role of the Ministry of Justice in pushing for the most favorable jurisdiction.

9) Practical guidance and what NOT to do

Nogacki warns against “noise” that overwhelms authorities:

  • He refutes rumors about personal data leaks to the darknet, saying he found no evidence and that such allegations can create unnecessary cases.
  • He warns against flooding European institutions with non-actionable complaints, stating that the European Commission is not a court of law in this context.

10) Damage calculation: PLN vs crypto; “deposits minus withdrawals” logic

He raises the issue of how damages will be measured:

  • He says it depends on whether the scheme was pure fiction (e.g., crypto not actually bought/held).
  • He cites a method used in other pyramid cases: if crypto was fictitious, damages can be calculated as deposits minus withdrawals, rather than based on nominal token values.
  • He notes that if “payments” are later pursued, they could be in PLN or in kind, depending on what can be shown and what the trustee chooses to pursue.

11) Other assets and related entities: limited but present hopes

  • He mentions possible asset leads (e.g., entities in Slovakia, Italy, Switzerland, and other holdings referenced by blockchain searches).
  • Still, he stresses many “balance sheet” values may be intangible and hard to monetize—especially after servers shut down or platforms ceased.

12) ZND token and “staking”

  • He suggests ZND token marketing had traits that might support separate grounds for victim status in criminal proceedings (possibly fraud from inception).
  • Regarding staking, he argues that if bankruptcy occurs:
    • contracts may terminate
    • there may be no reliable basis to claim staking rewards—especially if the underlying crypto purchases never happened, while the service UI only displayed them

Presenters / contributors

  • mec. Robert Nogacki — lawyer, legal counsel; presenter

Original video