TS Bùi Ngọc Sơn: NHIỀU NƯỚC BAO NĂM VẪN THU NHẬP TRUNG BÌNH, VIỆT NAM TRÁNH "VẾT XE ĐỔ” THẾ NÀO?

Main points & arguments in the panel (TS Bùi Ngọc Sơn)

• Vietnam is at the “upper-middle-income” threshold and faces the “middle-income trap.” The panel argues that Vietnam has moved from roughly US$170 per capita GDP (1993) to nearly US$5,000 (2025), but this only places it at the edge of upper-middle income. To become a developed, high-income country by 2045, Vietnam must still raise income substantially (the speaker mentions needing to reach around US$9,000 and beyond, toward high-income levels).

• The core shift Vietnam must make: from a “capital/cheap labor” growth model to a “technology & productivity” growth model. Vietnam has long relied on growth driven by cheap labor, resources, and credit/FDI-capital, especially through assembly roles in global supply chains. The speaker says this model is now exhausted: labor costs and land resources rise/are used up, while global competition and standards tighten. The needed breakthrough is to use advanced technology to climb from low-value assembly to higher-value design, components, and own products, escaping the middle-income trap.

• FDI is still important, but Vietnam must “select” FDI based on technology transfer. FDI should not be “any FDI.” Vietnam should encourage only FDI that brings high technology, and create conditions so domestic firms can absorb, learn, and move up the value chain.

• Institutional reform is presented as the decisive bottleneck—especially for private-sector development. A repeated conclusion is that Vietnam’s biggest problem is institutional openness and creating a true market environment that allows the private sector to thrive. The panel argues that successful catch-up economies (e.g., in East Asia) relied heavily on private business dynamism supported by state capabilities—rather than leaving everything to market alone, nor suppressing the private sector.

• Education, research capability, and a high-skill workforce are central to achieving technological upgrading. Vietnam’s labor force is described as lacking the high-quality technological workforce required for higher stages of the supply chain. The panel recommends:

  • reforming education and training so graduates can work immediately,
  • strengthening technical universities and research institutes,
  • improving scientific research environments and protecting intellectual property/“copyright,”
  • building a system that supports innovation, not only instruction.

• Why some countries succeed early but stall later (mechanism behind the trap). The panel explains middle-income stagnation as the exhaustion of “easy inputs” (labor, land, capital) without a new technology-driven productivity engine. Countries remain stuck when they cannot make new investments that generate new wealth (because those investments require skill and technology). This is compared to having people without the right tools—jobs exist but productivity (and thus income) does not rise enough to break through.

• Learning from international cases:

  • 1986 reforms are credited with “liberating productive forces” by moving toward a multi-sector economy, enabling private firms, and removing rigid administrative controls.
  • Argentina and Brazil are portrayed as resource-rich but politically “left-leaning/populist,” focused on distributing resources and importing goods rather than building industrial technology—leading to stagnation and recurring crises.
  • Turkey is used as an example of growth distorted by interest groups and real-estate/asset-driven strategies, producing inflation, chaos, and debt rather than new industry/technology.
  • Japan & South Korea (East Asian developmental state) are used to illustrate state support for private firms—funding research infrastructure, buying patents, training, and guiding key industries—then letting firms compete in the global market.

• Vietnam should not copy “national development models” mechanically; it must adopt principles that fit its context. The panel distinguishes development models (philosophy-based) from growth models (resource/engine-based). Vietnam should respect market signals and treat the private sector as a key foundation, while using the state to enable technology upgrading and institution-building.

• FDI-retention challenge: don’t just attract capital—retain technological value. The speaker warns that if Vietnam only offers cost advantages, foreign firms may relocate as costs rise. Vietnam must therefore retain and build domestic productive capacity and technological value, so FDI becomes a bridge for Vietnamese firms to move into higher segments.

• Concrete “proof” required in the next 5–10 years: Vietnam must demonstrate it can move beyond assembly/processing and start penetrating markets and supply chains with higher-value production. An example given: in electric vehicles, Vietnam could participate in manufacturing battery-related parts (or the battery pack components/materials), importing only limited inputs if needed—so domestic firms gain a foothold in higher-value stages.

• Green transition: follow global trends but manage timing/cost carefully. Climate/green growth is treated as an inevitable trend, but the panel argues Vietnam (as a latecomer) should not set goals too aggressively; some countries have already delayed stricter deadlines due to economic instability and cost.

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Conclusion / overall thesis

Vietnam’s next breakthrough to reach developed-country status by 2045 requires major growth-model transformation: institutional openness + strong private-sector ecosystem + education/research upgrading + technology absorption + technology-led productivity, with FDI targeted toward high-technology transfer and domestic firms building higher-value supply-chain roles.

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Presenters / contributors

• Dr. Bùi Ngọc Sơn (former head of the International Economics Department, Vietnam and World Economics Institute)
• Panel host / moderator (unnamed in subtitles; “Dr. Bùi Ngọc Sơn” is the main speaker)