Goșu: România a fost creată pentru a fi un stat anti-rusesc | Călătorii în trecut #9

Overview

Professor Arman Goșu argues that Romanian–Russian relations have been shaped less by “natural” hostility and more by shifting geopolitical projects, military events, and Western/Russian strategic imperatives over centuries.

Origins and early linkages (Moldavia/Wallachia–Moscow)

• Goșu traces major early contacts to the early 18th century, especially the 1711 campaign connected to Dimitrie Cantemir and Peter the Great. He frames this as part of a broader Romanian effort to navigate Ottoman pressure and Austrian–Western rivalry.
• Cantemir and related boyar networks are presented as important to Russian state-building and cultural life after Cantemir’s flight. In this account, Cantemir’s son, Antioch, becomes a significant cultural figure in Russia.
• After 1711, the Romanian principalities come under Ottoman suzerainty, with periodic Russian military involvement. Russia is described as using the region as an operations theater and repeatedly raising annexation or “independence” proposals for the principalities.

Russian imperial goals vs. European balancing

• A recurring theme is that Russia’s long-term strategic obsession was not merely the Balkans, but access routes tied to Constantinople and the “restoration of Byzantium,” which repeatedly alarmed European powers.
• Because of this grand design, coalitions against Russia formed frequently. Russia gains territory piecemeal across wars, while facing concerted efforts by other powers to limit its expansion.
• Goșu emphasizes that Russia’s ability to acquire and hold territory has often depended on opponents’ divisions and on “partition” logic (notably the partitions of Poland), rather than purely on Balkan liberation narratives.

The Crimean Khanate and territorial outcomes

• He highlights Russia’s conquest/annexation of Crimea as a key early strategic victory—more important than later events beyond it.
• Territorial borders affecting present-day Romania and the region are discussed as outcomes of recurring campaigns and treaties, with attention to when Russia reached and controlled Romanian-adjacent areas.

19th-century Russian administration in Romanian lands (as modernization)

• Goșu distinguishes myth from reality regarding Russian administration under officials like Kiseleff. He argues that while the administration had real modernizing elements, it was also embedded in Russian strategic interests.
• He also claims Russian influence created cultural and social channels, including:
  • French language and culture through Russian-educated nobles and officers
  • intermarriage between Romanian boyars and Russian officers
  • an elite-level “integration” mechanism

From “shared Orthodox identity” to anti-Russian nation-building

• Goșu argues that before the late 19th century, Romanians were not broadly “anti-Russian” in the modern sense, largely due to shared Orthodox identity and Ottoman religious tolerance toward Christians.
• The shift toward anti-Russian education and identity is described as a post–Crimean War “job description” shaped by Western diplomatic outcomes. In this view, Romania needed to be positioned as a buffer and deterrent to Russian access to Istanbul.
• This anti-Russian framing is portrayed as transmitted through schooling and nation-building projects, creating a durable public mental model—despite more nuanced elite views.

Interwar and 1940 trauma: Moldova/Bessarabia “abandonment” narrative

• Goșu contends that interwar Romania’s limited investment in Bessarabia—especially in education and civic presence—contributed to lasting resentment.
• He discusses the 1940 Soviet takeover and the enduring Moldovan/Chisinău narrative that Romania “betrayed” Bessarabia, comparing it to propaganda that leverages that memory.
• He addresses counterfactuals by rejecting simplistic certainty such as “Romania should have fought” or “Romania would have gotten it back,” arguing that outcomes were contingent and that historical “conditional” claims are not reliable.

Post-1989: Russia misunderstood; policy criticized

• In the modern period, Goșu criticizes Romanian political decision-making toward Russia as repeatedly “out of step,” suggesting delays and miscalculated efforts to “relaunch” relations.
• He claims Romanian energy and pipeline dynamics disadvantaged Romania at certain points and that decision logic on major security and infrastructure topics was unclear.
• He argues that Romania still has institutional anchoring in the West/NATO, but internally faces fragility—corruption, weak governance, and insufficient preparedness—factors that amplify vulnerability during crises.

Current security outlook and the Ukraine war (analytical, not emotional)

• He predicts 2024/2025 dynamics for Russia and Ukraine as constrained by human resources and the nature of positional warfare.
• Russia is argued to be unable to force major breakthroughs without renewed mobilization, while Ukraine’s attritional pressure and battlefield ratios make long-term outcomes uncertain.
• Political-electoral timing in Russia is suggested as potentially linked to future mobilization or strategy, though he doubts “implosion” guarantees.
• He describes the possibility of dramatic events (“black swans”), such as internal elite rupture or leadership change, without committing to a specific timeline.

NATO membership and Romania’s role

• Goșu frames NATO membership as essential but not automatic. Romania’s defense readiness requires interoperability, planning, and investment in weapons and training—not reliance on others “coming to solve it.”
• He highlights a contrast in security cohesion, especially among Baltic/Nordic states, where he perceives stronger unity around defense preparation.

Presenters / contributors

• Arman Goșu (Professor)