Video summary

Время надувать единорогов | Выборы 2026 — пора действовать (English subtitles) @Max_Katz

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Key takeaways

News and Commentary

Core Argument: “Paralyzing skepticism” (not state power alone)

The speaker argues that the primary threat to opposition efforts in the 2026 election is not the authorities’ power by itself, but “paralyzing skepticism”—the belief that nothing can change because the state (specifically referencing the FSB) controls everything.

He says this skepticism has two main roots:

  1. Long-term lack of meaningful influence: For years, people were accustomed to having little or no real ability to affect federal elections (with the last meaningful influence cited as 1999).
  2. System incentives to discourage resistance: The system benefits from persuading citizens that resistance is futile.

Evidence Attempt: Resistance may be effective (traffic analysis)

The speaker tries to demonstrate—using website traffic data—that resistance is not futile and that the upcoming election may be largely “under the radar.”

He claims:

  • His district-by-district website already has millions of visits.
  • This could translate to roughly 10–20% of voters accessing it by election day.
  • Even more strikingly, individual district pages already receive visitor volumes comparable to opposition vote totals from prior elections (often comparing to losing margins and vote counts).
  • With the expected election-day traffic surge, opposition candidates could plausibly overtake United Russia in multiple districts—at times even reaching “certainty” levels or margins too large to be easily erased by fraud.

Claimed District Examples and Geographic Scope

The speaker lists example districts across major cities and regions, including:

  • Central St. Petersburg
  • Central Moscow
  • Yekaterinburg
  • Krasnoyarsk
  • Altai Krai

He claims that opposition-aligned candidates (frequently Yabloko) already lead or are near overtaking United Russia due to the number of people visiting those district pages.

He argues this effect could also extend beyond major metros:

  • “Four times” the current traffic could allegedly produce decisive gaps.
  • He also claims some opponents are under pressure, including cases where authorities supposedly cleared alternative candidates to win (not always United Russia), which could further help defeat pro-government candidates through vote splitting.

Key Operational Detail: Blocked site, continued traffic via VPN

The speaker states that the website was blocked in Russia, but claims traffic remains largely unaffected because supporters use VPNs.

He advises:

  • Use a share button and distribute information via messaging apps (specifically WhatsApp and Telegram).
  • Send screenshots showing:
    • the candidate slate(s),
    • and the number of visits to the relevant district page.
  • The goal is to convert awareness into turnout and votes.

Strategic Logic: Why coordination could reduce falsification success

He argues there is limited downside to coordinated promotion, and that increased attention could make it harder for the system to falsify results convincingly.

He also claims:

  • hackers breached electoral authorities’ systems,
  • and this could either prevent rigging or increase the odds that fraud is exposed or backfires on public sentiment.

Broader theme:

  • Fraud tends to be most effective when most citizens are indifferent.
  • If newly engaged or previously nonpolitical voters learn the truth—e.g., being allegedly counted as supporting war and United Russia despite not doing so—outcomes may become more unpredictable and legitimacy may erode.

Call to Action (last five days)

The speaker calls for action in the remaining five days:

  • Coordinate and persuade bloggers/public figures to amplify an “alternative opposition slate” (referred to as “pink unicorn” in past context and tied to a broad, agreed list).
  • Do it calmly and politely—requests rather than demands.
  • Create a fast wave of media attention, using district-specific information and current traffic metrics.
  • Drive turnout, including persuading nonvoters in Russia if abroad (one person, ideally five).

He acknowledges uncertainty and the possibility of failure, but insists the campaign must try because the slate is already visible, measurable, and could “make the election uncomfortable” for authorities.

Presenters or Contributors

  • Max Katz (speaker)
  • Yulia Navalnaya (referenced as distributing lists)
  • Sergey Mitrokhin (referenced candidate in a Moscow district)
  • Isakov (Yabloko lawyer; referenced candidate)
  • Nadezhdin (referenced from earlier queue/debate context)
  • Dmitrieva (referenced St. Petersburg winner; past election)
  • United Russia (referenced throughout)
  • Yabloko (referenced throughout)
  • LDPR (referenced in one district example)
  • Communist businessman / Communist candidate (referenced in an Altai Krai example)
  • Sergei Mitrokhin (listed as a contributor as mentioned; no additional speaker involved)

Original video