Czy Polska potrzebuje obowiązkowego poboru? | Bartosiak, Parafianowicz, Piotrowski | TERAZ Debata #3

Summary

The debate focused on whether Poland should restore compulsory military service. The panelists broadly rejected a return to the old model of conscription but disagreed on how extensive a new, compulsory system of national preparation should be.

Proposals for national service and defence preparation

• General Tomasz Piotrowski opposed simply reinstating the former service system. He said it would require serious planning and could not be reduced to sending young people into barracks. He supported a broader, potentially universal duty to prepare for national defence, including training for cyber threats, disinformation, civil protection, and critical-infrastructure security. However, he warned that the armed forces alone could not train everyone. Poland first needs a clear security strategy, defined military purposes, and a workable plan for delivering training.
• Zbigniew Parafianowicz rejected the old conscription model, recalling its dysfunctions and the poor use of recruits’ time. He was open to a wider form of public or state service that could include the military, emergency services, fire services, and other nationally important roles. He argued that such service could help train reserves and strengthen social cohesion.
• Jacek Bartosiak argued for a far-reaching “universal defence duty” applying to women and men and potentially extending well beyond young people. He favoured a modern, flexible system that draws on people’s civilian skills—such as IT, logistics, engineering, and drone operation—rather than keeping everyone in barracks. He said the system would need to be fair and form part of a new social contract, including changes to the perceived imbalance between the public and private sectors.

Training, participation, and deterrence

The panelists connected broad-based preparation with deterrence and national resilience. They argued that training should address modern threats, not just conventional infantry skills. Topics raised included first aid, civil defence, recognising disinformation, cyber capabilities, operating drones, and protecting critical infrastructure. Bartosiak also supported drone and robotics education in schools and universities.

There was no consensus on how to make participation attractive. Bartosiak suggested meaningful roles and possibly financial incentives, while Piotrowski was sceptical that extra pay would be a lasting motivator. He preferred universal incentives—for example, recognising completion of training as evidence of teamwork or leadership skills. The discussion generally rejected harsh punishment for evasion. Piotrowski argued that relying on sanctions would indicate a failure to build trust and legitimacy.

Force size and planning

Piotrowski cited an older planning estimate of roughly 300,000–400,000 personnel in an available force component, plus reserves several times larger. He stressed that the figure was outdated and could not be responsibly set without first deciding what the armed forces are meant to do.

Bartosiak likewise argued that capability, adaptability, and the effective use of civilian expertise matter more than numbers alone, while acknowledging that reserves and overall scale remain important.

Strategy and practical steps

The speakers said that a national security strategy and a clear defence directive are essential, but practical steps should begin in parallel. Recommendations raised included:

• Improving public alerts about air attacks.
• Creating an experimental drone unit.
• Reducing bureaucratic obstacles to drone development and procurement.
• Enabling businesses to obtain systems to protect critical infrastructure.

Piotrowski also emphasised the need for coherent public communication and greater cooperation across government and local authorities.

Russia, NATO, and alliances

The panel discussed Russia as a persistent threat. Piotrowski said Russia should be neither underestimated nor assumed to be as capable as it claims. He warned that it continues to rebuild military capacity and sustain an imperial narrative. Bartosiak stressed the danger of limited or hybrid operations that might test NATO cohesion, and argued that Poland needs capabilities to respond without relying entirely on allies.

Piotrowski cautioned against treating speculative scenarios as established fact. He reiterated that Poland’s military doctrine should be fundamentally defensive: the priority is deterrence and preventing conflict, while ensuring that any attack would meet a decisive response.

The discussion also reflected uncertainty about US policy and the reliability of alliances. Bartosiak warned that Russia could see opportunities in divisions between the United States and Europe. Piotrowski argued that Poland should not assume either that allies will always provide help or that they will abandon it. He pointed to the complexity of NATO commitments and the importance of Poland’s own readiness.

Recorded question on Russian military potential

Analyst Anna Maria Dyner asked about Russian military potential and stockpiling. Piotrowski replied that Russia remains a serious challenge and is rebuilding its capabilities, while noting that its performance in Ukraine had revealed limits in its ability to conduct joint operations. He said Poland should watch these developments closely.

Presenters and contributors

• Patrycjusz Wyżga — moderator and presenter
• Gen. Tomasz Piotrowski — former Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces
• Jacek Bartosiak — founder and president of Strategy and Future
• Zbigniew Parafianowicz — Wirtualna Polska journalist and war correspondent
• Anna Maria Dyner — analyst who contributed a recorded question
• Mikołaj Pisarski and Kuba — audience participants whose questions were read or raised during the debate