Summary of "Book Event - "On Xi Jinping" with Ambassador Kevin Rudd"

Event overview

At a CSIS event, Ambassador Kevin Rudd discussed his new book on Xi Jinping. Rudd argued that Xi’s ideological program—a fusion of renewed Leninism, Marxist economic policies, and assertive nationalism—is the key to understanding China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory since 2012.

“Ideology matters.” Rudd stressed that Marxism‑Leninism and “Xi Jinping Thought” are not mere rhetoric but an organizing framework that shapes what is permissible in political debate and policy in China.

Main arguments and points

Ideology as a leading indicator: Rudd argues that party ideology (Marxism‑Leninism / Xi Jinping Thought) actively shapes what the CCP permits in debate and policy and therefore anticipates Chinese political change.
Xi’s ideological program consists of three linked moves that reorient politics, the economy, and foreign/security policy (see next section).
Agency: Rudd contends Xi is the principal agent driving these changes, not merely expressing a preexisting elite consensus.
Practical effects: Top‑down ideological dissemination produces high ideological literacy among cadres and generates caution, risk aversion, and reduced foreign partnerships at the local and enterprise levels.
Strategic implication: Understanding Xi’s ideological program is essential for predicting China’s policy choices and for shaping democratic responses over coming decades.

Three linked ideological moves under Xi

Re‑center the Leninist party (politics)
- Reasserted the Communist Party’s paramount role across government, business, academia, and society.
- Centralized leadership authority, reinforced through discipline, anti‑corruption campaigns, and tighter control over discourse.
Move the economy to the Marxist left (economic policy)
- From about 2017 (19th Party Congress) the party redefined its “central contradiction,” justifying stronger state control.
- Policies include a larger role for state‑owned enterprises (SOEs), active industrial policy, large state investment funds, emphasis on “common prosperity,” and self‑reliance—shifting away from the prior reform-and-opening market orthodoxy.
Shift foreign/security policy to the nationalist right (foreign policy)
- China has become more assertive internationally: military modernization, territorial assertiveness in the region, and a more global posture (e.g., Belt and Road Initiative, “global development/security/civilization” initiatives).
- This marks a departure from a previous “hide and bide” approach.

Agency vs. structure

Rudd argues Xi is the primary mover who pulled the CCP in a new direction rather than merely reflecting an already settled elite consensus.
Xi’s personal ideological canon and leadership decisions were decisive in producing the directional shifts across politics, economy, and foreign policy.
Events such as domestic financial stress in 2015 helped justify and accelerate the turn toward greater state control.

How ideology is applied in practice

Top‑down dissemination: party schools, study groups, propaganda campaigns that raise ideological literacy among cadres.
Practical local/enterprise effects:
- Caution and inertia driven by fear of corruption accusations and political risk.
- Reduced willingness to partner with foreign entities.
- Risk‑averse behavior that can impede innovation and adaptive decision‑making.

Xi’s longer endgame and “integrations”

Rudd characterizes the system as increasingly totalizing, with a long‑term ideological end state rooted in Marxist historicism (an eventual communist end‑state).
“Second integration”: further Sinicization of Marxism by incorporating classical Chinese ideas into CCP doctrine.
Possible “third integration”: an emergent idea to adapt aspects of global culture to broaden the CCP’s international and cross‑cultural appeal.

Q&A highlights

On Russia
- Rudd acknowledged historical Sino‑Soviet antagonism but observed that Xi’s China sees alignment with Russia as pragmatically useful in relation to the United States and its allies.
On elite underestimation of Xi
- Rudd suggested events (e.g., 2015 financial stress) helped convince Xi and justified a turn toward more state control; Xi then consolidated power and implemented the ideological turn.
On what Chinese students and intellectuals read
- Popular translated works include Graham Allison (Thucydides Trap), writings by Kishore Mahbubani, and prominent Chinese scholars.
- Rudd noted growing limits on permissible reading within elite Chinese universities.

Practical implications

To predict China’s policy choices and craft effective responses, democracies should take Xi’s ideological program seriously—its logic, instruments, and long‑term objectives.
Policies and engagement strategies should account for the political‑ideological constraints shaping Chinese decision‑making at national and subnational levels.

Event format and presenters

Format: Rudd presented as a scholar (not in his official ambassadorial capacity), gave a short lecture on the book’s thesis, participated in a moderated conversation and audience Q&A, and remained for a book signing.
Presenters and contributors:
- Kevin Rudd — Ambassador, former Prime Minister of Australia; author and speaker
- John Hamre — President, CSIS (opening welcome)
- Charles (Charlie) Edel — Senior Adviser, inaugural Australia Chair, CSIS (formal introduction)
- Jude Blanchette — Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS (moderator)