Summary of "Мы стоим на пороге нового конфликта! Что нас ждет дальше? Андрей Безруков про США, Россию и кризис"

Summary

This document summarizes the main points from Andrey Bezrukov’s analysis on the changing global order, Russia’s strategic position, military-technical developments, economic risks, policy prescriptions, and investment views.

The world is entering a new phase of geopolitical and technological redistribution: the post–WWII globalized order and U.S. hegemony are eroding as competing techno‑economic macroregions form around the United States, China, and regional coalitions, driven by a new technological cycle (AI, genetics, microelectronics, directed‑energy systems, advanced drones).

Big-picture diagnosis

A new technological cycle (AI, genetics, microelectronics, directed‑energy systems, advanced drones) will reshape economies, societies, and power balances.
The post–World War II globalized order and U.S. hegemonic position are eroding.
Competing techno‑economic macroregions (blocs) are forming around the United States, China, and regional coalitions.

Russia’s strategic situation and options

Bezrukov’s 2016 forecast (Russia and the World in 2020) anticipated a global redistribution; if the West failed to stop Russia’s path to sovereignty, the global order would evolve differently — a process he argues is now underway.
Russia cannot economically match the U.S. or China but remains a military great power.
Realistic strategy: build a larger integrated economic space with complementary partners (India, Iran, Southeast Asian states, and other states seeking to preserve sovereignty) to create scale for investment in defense, science, and industry.
The declared aim of the “special military operation” is to remove long‑term security threats on Russia’s western borders by ensuring any remaining Ukrainian territory cannot become a future military threat (no large industrial base, no seaport access, no political will to rearm).
Negotiated security guarantees acceptable to Russia are presented as the condition for stopping the operation.

War and military technology

A revolution in military affairs: war increasingly spans information warfare, network interdiction, swarms of drones, remote delivery of small but highly destructive devices, experiments with subcritical nuclear techniques, and directed-energy weapons.
These developments complicate nuclear deterrence and lower thresholds for new kinds of strategic attacks.
Nations are learning to exploit communications and commercial technology to monitor and disable systems (examples cited: incidents in Iran, Venezuela, and attacks similar to Operation Spider Web).
New methods create asymmetric vulnerabilities across states and systems.

Scenarios for the conflict’s end

Protracted attrition / slow advance with drawn‑out negotiations
- Western aim may be to prolong fighting to exhaust Russian resources.
Breakthrough / failure at the Ukrainian front and quicker resolution
- Possible if Ukrainian human and Western economic support collapses.
A negotiated settlement on Western terms
- Considered unlikely politically and socially within Russia.

Economic outlook and risks

Bezrukov warns of an overheated global asset bubble (AI hype compared to the dot‑com bubble); a major correction could trigger a deep global crisis that would hit resource exporters hard.
Russia has partial insulation from global capital-market volatility due to financial disconnection since sanctions, but long‑term vulnerabilities include deindustrialization and overreliance on the resource economy.
Priorities for resilience and development:
- Rebuild production and manufacturing base
- Develop microelectronics and advanced technologies
- Restore logistics capabilities (aviation, engines, rail, shipping)
- Strengthen energy sector, engineering, and scientific base
- Create a middle class and social stability through industrial development

Policy criticism and prescriptions

Critique of current monetary policy:
- The Central Bank’s tight, high key‑rate, anti‑inflation stance is judged counterproductive for industrial development and financing innovation; Bezrukov describes this as near‑sabotage of national development.
- He grades the financial/economic bloc negatively for insufficient creativity and adaptability.
Calls for proactive state policy:
- Long‑term strategic planning (infrastructure, industrial priorities, human capital)
- Targeted monetary and fiscal measures, including targeted issuance to finance growth (as used by other rapid developers)
- A sovereign‑oriented monetary and financial framework (stronger sovereign ruble, domestic investment instruments)
The state must create predictable, long‑horizon frameworks so businesses can plan (example: Rosatom’s 100‑year horizon).
Major infrastructure and industrial projects will require state leadership and patient finance.

Technology, entrepreneurship, and capital allocation

Microelectronics is foundational for AI, information systems, and economic sovereignty.
Russia possesses a strong scientific and mathematical education base and engineering competence; technological reconstruction is feasible with appropriate policies and market scale.
Entrepreneurship requires:
- Clear state direction and a sufficient market scale
- The state to build legal, infrastructure, and planning conditions (but not act as the entrepreneur)
Bezrukov is cautiously optimistic that economic reformatting can occur in 5–10 years if effective levers and policy changes are implemented.

Investment advice and views on assets

Personal capital preservation (conservative approach):
- Preference for real assets: real estate, land, gold, commodities
- Domestic bonds of large companies/state and bank deposits
- Skepticism toward speculative markets and crypto in a contested information/technology environment
Cryptocurrencies:
- Skeptical view: as information‑system products they remain vulnerable to state control and technical suppression
- May be useful as transactional tools but not a reliable refuge in systemic turmoil
Stock market investing:
- Requires clear understanding of a company’s technology and future prospects; otherwise it is speculative

Closing assessment

Bezrukov expects a difficult near future but believes Russia can adapt and reindustrialize if it:
- Pursues targeted policies
- Builds broader economic ties with like‑minded partners
- Mobilizes creativity and engineering capabilities
He expresses guarded optimism that current pressure can spur accelerated development.

Presenters / contributors

Andrey Olegovich Bezrukov — Professor, Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems at GIMO; political scientist; retired colonel of foreign intelligence (guest)
Podcast host / interviewer — name not provided in subtitles