Summary of "#TopSecret: Operasi Intelijen Negara Asing Masa Presiden Sukarno"
Episode overview
This episode of Top Secret (a program of the National Archives / Pusdippres) examines US intelligence operations in Indonesia during President Sukarno’s era. Historian/journalist Hendri Isna explains archival evidence, known operations, motives, and long-term effects, drawing on declassified US documents, Indonesian archives, testimonies, and secondary literature.
Main findings
- The US maintained a continuous intelligence presence and used multiple covert strategies in Indonesia between the late 1940s and 1965, including political influence, covert aid, training, and paramilitary support.
- A decisive turning point came with the 1965 events and the subsequent anti‑PKI purge, which aligned Indonesian policy with Western economic and geopolitical interests and helped establish the model later labeled the “Jakarta Method.”
- Archival research (declassified CIA files and ANRI collections) is essential to clarify contested episodes and to draw lessons for present‑day vigilance against foreign covert operations.
Origins and early presence (1945–1947)
- US wartime OSS teams were operating in Indonesia as early as September 1945 (Operation Iceberg). Their activities included repatriation and groundwork for long‑term intelligence collection.
- The OSS later evolved into the CIA in 1947. Arthur Campbell is identified as the first CIA station chief in the Dutch East Indies.
Primary US objective
- Monitoring and countering the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was the main US objective.
- US concern about the PKI increased after its re‑emergence following Indonesian independence and especially after the 1948 Madiun uprising.
- US agents cultivated contacts within Indonesian political and security circles and arranged training for some Indonesian police personnel.
1950s politics and elections
- The CIA reportedly provided covert support—material aid and possibly funds—to anti‑PKI political forces such as Masyumi in the lead-up to the 1955 election, intended to limit PKI influence.
- Evidence for some of these claims remains contested in archives and later secondary works.
Permesta and PRRI (late 1950s)
- The CIA covertly backed regional rebellions (Permesta/PRRI) with arms deliveries (air drops, ships/submarine deliveries), aircraft, and foreign pilots.
- The capture and trial of US pilot Allen Pope exposed CIA involvement. That exposure:
- Forced the US to withdraw overt support.
- Triggered US diplomatic efforts (Robert Kennedy lobbied for Pope’s release).
- Led to political bargaining—Indonesia extracted concessions such as military hardware (for example, C-130 Hercules).
Campaigns against Sukarno and Asia‑Africa alignment
- Sukarno’s leadership in anti‑colonial and Non‑Aligned Movement initiatives (e.g., Bandung/Asia‑Africa) alarmed US policymakers.
- Reported CIA efforts to undermine Sukarno included sabotage, plots (alleged attempts to poison or bomb delegations and to target foreign leaders such as Zhou Enlai), blackmail operations (an alleged fake pornographic film plot), surveillance (medical sampling), and other covert actions intended to damage Sukarno’s standing and prevent alignment with the Soviet/Chinese blocs.
1965 (G30S) and the aftermath
- The episode reviews debates over the September 30th Movement (G30S): it was a complex event with internal PKI dynamics and army factionalism.
- Direct CIA orchestration of G30S is disputed, but archival materials suggest US assistance during and after 1965, including:
- Communications support.
- Intelligence lists of PKI figures reportedly provided to the Indonesian army.
- The post‑1965 purge and Sukarno’s fall fit a broader pattern of supporting internal forces to overthrow or neutralize leftist movements without large‑scale overt military intervention—the so‑called “Jakarta Method.”
International pattern and motives
- The methods used in Indonesia are compared to US covert actions elsewhere (Guatemala, Iran, Chile, etc.).
- Motives combined geopolitical aims (containing communism, preventing a domino effect), ideological factors, and economic interests—such as securing access for foreign investment and resource concessions (Freeport is cited as an example).
Sources and historiography
- The discussion draws on:
- Declassified US documents (CIA files).
- Indonesian archives (ANRI/presidential archives).
- Testimonies and secondary works by authors such as David Wise, Tim Weir, Ken Conboy, and John Roosa.
- Many claims remain contested and require further archival corroboration.
Contemporary relevance
- Hendri Isna argues that these historical intelligence operations offer lessons for today: foreign covert influence remains a risk and Indonesia should study archival records to better guard its sovereignty.
Conclusions emphasized in the episode
- US intelligence maintained an ongoing presence and employed multiple covert strategies in Indonesia (especially 1947–1965), ranging from political influence and covert aid to direct paramilitary support; major exposures (e.g., Allen Pope) altered US tactics.
- The 1965 events and the post‑1965 anti‑PKI campaign were a decisive turning point, aligning Indonesian policy with Western interests and producing a model of covert regime change often referred to as the “Jakarta Method.”
- Continued archival research is crucial to clarify contested episodes and inform present‑day policy and vigilance against covert operations.
Presenters and contributors
- Host: Widi Putro Asiparis (media expert, ASIP Nasional)
- Guest: Hendri Isna (writer/editor at Historia; author on intelligence operations in Indonesia)
- Program produced/presented by: National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI) / Pusat Arsip Kepresidenan (Pusdippres)
Category
News and Commentary
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